









this work is licensed under the creative commons 
attribution-noncommercial-noderivs 3.0 unported license. 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
printed by lightning source, milton keynes 
in an endless edition (version 110606) 
ISBN 978-90-817091-0-1
design by mIchelle aNdrea waN
uitgeverij, den haag 
shtëpia botuese, tiranë 






























I don’t want to talk about it, for fear of making literature  
out of it—or without being sure of not doing so—although  
as a matter of fact literature originates within these truths.
-
rolaNd BarTheS, ‘a cruel country’

For maUrIce JameS BeINS; 





Into my little world
Painful to me
Pierce right through me
can’t you understand
oh my little girl
all I ever wanted
all I ever needed
Is here in my arms
words are very unnecessary






So does the pain
words are meaningless
and forgettable
all I ever wanted
all I ever needed
Is here in my arms
words are very unnecessary
They can only do harm
-











… murmur, murmur, murmurmur, hmm, capable only of a first reflex, I 
tell myself. It doesn’t need to be a full-blown reflection, she’s only asking 
for a sign, maybe a note. I don’t even have to carry a melody. Philippe, 
Philippe. I can’t think straight, oh yes, “echo of the Subject,” the stuff 
about the caesura, poetry, and muteness. The anthropological hinge in 
heidegger: I could do that, maybe. Get in on the subtle takedown, firm yet 
cautious. I don’t know. Too much focus, I can hardly see straight. I need 
to find a libido pulley. what about the “retreat of the political” or, better 
yet, the blurb he did for me, yes make it about me, that will stoke the writ-
ing engine, not bad, oh come off it, have you lost your senses Superego 
pounces on me, with the usual “eyes on the prize” corrective, go in the di-
rection of honoring, keep yourself on the sidelines of the commemorative 
agony, refuse manic compensation, bow the head but go on, as if we could 
go on, must go on, a “must go on” that warps rapidly into a sneering, “go 
on, oh just go on,” as if I had stretched myself beyond credibility. already, 
so soon. wait, I could render homage to Philippe’s hyperbologic, but that’s 
still kind of about me, too much feed for the autobiographical trace, I’m 
always on the outskirts of the hyperbologic, even when I’m off duty, just 
hanging out, keeping basically to myself and out of nowhere they say that 
I exaggerate or invent (cixous: “when I said that you invent, I did not 
call you a liar, avital, you have misunderstood me, chérie”). Still too much 
about me, makes me cringe, I’ve got to take myself out of the running 
here, off the table, or whatever they say for self-effacement in mourning. 
Find a calmer tonality, the missing musical note. or just drop it. can’t do 
that. “Is life worth living?” remember, suddenly in max weber. But that 
has nothing to do with Philippe. except for the structure of the haunting 
melody that he depicts. In my head: “Is life worth living?” philosophy’s 
urgent question. Note, Not: distress, in German, heavily accented in his 
work. maybe I should do something with his reading of “Dichtermut” (The 
Poet’s courage) and the rhetoric of exaggeration; that’ll teach them. But 
now, this is commemorative, remember, I should stay within the precincts 
1 a version of this text is previously published as “l’indélicatesse d’un interminable fondu au noir” in avital 
ronell. Lignes de front. trans. daniel loayza. (editions Stock, l’autre pensée: Paris), 2010.
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of “Andenken” (remembrance), maybe, sticking with the hölderlin poem 
to which Philippe devoted so much reflective energy; he went so far as to 
translate it even and gave the voice over on the film we watched. his voice. 
voice over. over, über, vorüber, over. all this on fast spin cycle. can’t do it, 
no can do, will she be mad at me? after all those pages pledged to mourn-
ing pathology and manic economies of writing. Is it oK to say nothing and 
let him drift away on his own? 
on the other hand, can I avoid the narcissism of annexation, of 
putting teethmarks of ownership on him, taking a bite out of him, as der-
rida evokes with his run of morsels, the sounds that go with remorse, 
mort, the whole gamut of bite-size instances of incorporation. I could do it 
nicely, with a toothy grin, make him mine, open wide and introject. “he’s 
a part of me, Philippe, my Philippe, I love him like a … here are some 
story lines to prove it.” No, kind of inevitable, swallowing him whole at this 
time, but can’t do that either, too unconscious, too indecent, part of the 
facile “appropriation” of the missing companion. what about dépropria-
tion, I can do something about his tendency toward disinstallation and 
this way climb into the think tank of his oeuvre. he taught me that Ni-
etzsche was the absence of an oeuvre, everything being organized around 
the hole punched into an unclosing work. he read heidegger to us, made 
heidegger bearable, as Susan says, he provided us with the e-z pass to 
heidegger, though never making it easy, actually making it all that much 
harder, taking off the blinkers, calling up the solar storm of an unbypass-
able thought. can’t do this. It’s too soon. Too dark. I can sway instead to 
phantom music, but am incapacitated as concerns the rest of the grammar 
of summation. Something like a dialectical summation would be called for 
now, absurdly difficult, requires some lucidity and a measure of distance. 
my swaying and staggering hasn’t reached the Nietzschean Dis-tanz. I’m a 
scholar, I should be able to produce, “poiesize,” something blindfolded at 
this point, on the verge of consciousness, at this point, I say to myself. how 
can I numb myself on automatic and ticker type out my sorrow? maybe I 
can draw up lists, checking off the themes and topoi, the lexical innova-
tions that he created and the vocabulary of being that his work calls up. 
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That would be a contribution, I say to myself, just start a ledger, become 
a bookkeeper of the departed friend. That’s a service in itself, I don’t need 
even to put a “self ” in there or sing along to the bouncing ball of mourn-
ing and mania, just start transcribing, straightening columns of his en-
tries into the world of thought. I see only advantages to such a procedure, 
topped off by an affective bonus: I can stay numbed out this way, at most 
switching here and there into dJ mode, putting some work into relation 
with itself, scratching and popping but not getting involved or pumping 
up energy that I don’t have for thinking or bringing things together. It’s 
too soon. I am depleted, washed out by Philippe’s disparition, as they say. 
here’s what I can do for you. I’ll accept the job of zombie transcriber, as 
secretary of the phantom (which is all I ever wanted to be anyway), I’ll 
just be writing shorthand, taking it down without any blown up myths 
of interiority or authorial inspiration or subjectivizing winds for my sails. 
This way “I,” barely a punctuation mark, could ride into a crease in his 
thinking of the “défaillance of myth,” I’ll come in from another side of the 
faltering subject. maybe I can offer a survey of what denis has brought to 
light: what it is that we underline when we read someone, he asked in the 
memorial. That’s what I can do, I’ll accumulate all the underlinings and 
maybe collect those of the other mourners. what have they underlined in 
his work? what kind of an appropriative line does the underscore bring 
up to us at this time? Philippe would approve this move, I believe. he’d 
understand my distress and the reversion to a line. maybe I’ll stay close to 
Philippe’s distress, make it my home, I say to myself. I can tally and tabu-
late, start up the books, press “distress.”
It could be that no one among the great French philosophers has 
understood distress as well as Philippe lacoue-labarthe. he rode the wave 
of hölderlin’s phrase, “in dürft’ger Zeit” (in hollowed time) and found 
his way through heidegger’s Not until the end of an impressive oeuvre. 
lacoue-labarthe blended tropes of distress into an unparalleled rhetoric 
of ethicity, without turning this into a burden or inflating the accepted 
currencies of prescriptive discourse. he often stood alone, even though 
he was the most outreaching of thinkers who partnered up momentously 
avITal roNell
17
with Jean-luc Nancy, Jean-christophe Bailly and a number of others. his 
political thought extended to institutions as it retreated from their delud-
ed complacency and schizoid evacuations. he never gave up on poetry, 
never; he was among the only rigorous philosophers, apart from Schopen-
hauer, sometimes Nietzsche and maybe also adorno, to have heard music 
and let it in, asking it to speak. he had perfect pitch for historical disaster 
and the caesura. he cleared terrible abysses and scanned the losses that 
pockmark something like a rhetorical unconscious. he stood up together 
with Nancy to read lacan for lacan—lacan characteristically blasted his 
own disciples for not being able to match the acuity of Le titre de la lettre, 
where they exemplarily took on the master psychoanalyst. his care and 
carefulness remain unprecedented … 
**********
I’ll pull in my oars, sit with the stillness. ok. well, not ok, but it’s 
the best I can do under the circumstances. I am so under the circum-
stances, so distressed, blue: “Blue” was one of Philippe’s last words ac-
cording to claire Nancy. “what do you mean you don’t feel well? are you 
talking mentally or physically?” “In a bluesy kind of way,” he had said in 
the hospital, shortly before the end. his attachment to the blues, in the 
musical mode, I mean, is by now legendary. one could say, stretching 
things, that it provides the upbeat for the wagner readings, returning in 
a contrapuntal sort of way to transpose, if only on a track set on mute 
(as Freud says of the death drive), the musical ideologies and pernicious 
identitarian backdrop of national aestheticism. “The Blues contra wag-
ner”: Nietzsche could have pulled this off, with his sense of ensemble and 
fracture. The blues separate off from the heavy Germanic purposefulness 
of destinal meaning and the abyssal euphoria of wagner. It is as if, for 
lacoue-labarthe, Nietzsche’s criticism of wagner (which heidegger, for 
once, seconds and upholds) could bypass the Bizet aberration paraded 
by Nietzsche in his early contra-wagner phases and feed directly into the 
blues. Philippe lacoue-labarthe was seized by the blues at the limit of 
finitude, when taking his last breaths. 
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In my years of fond and often intense friendship—the kind that im-
plies reliance, intimacy and the infinite conversation, as well as a sense of 
the irony of the whole thing—Philippe would often self-gather, I thought, 
in the inenarrable vicinity of the blues. It shows up again, the attachment 
to the blues but for the most part as “jazz,” in Le chant des muses, the “petite 
conférence” that lacoue-labarthe offered at le centre dramatique national 
de montreuil in conversation with a group of children meant to show “un 
mouvement d’amitié traversant les generations,” according to the preface of 
the book given to me by micaela Kramer, who had been present at the event. 
The model for this sort of encounter and address was walter Benjamin’s 
radio program between 1929 and 1932, meant for children. Philippe chose 
to speak to the assembled children about music and philosophy, about the 
muses and the blues, the Greeks and rhythmos—even about music as “une 
production (une poïesis ‘technique’): un art.” I am drawn now to this scene 
not only because micaela, beloved student, brought it to my attention as 
I was casting about in despair of his loss, dispirited and speechless … I 
thought I’d just listen to music, that’s what I’ll do, I’ll listen to music with 
and through Philippe, stereophonically hooking him up to Nietzsche, who 
put the spirit in music despite all the disclaimers, I’ll just sit and listen to 
his music, micaela gave me the idea and the Jungian analyst with whom 
I had taken a course at the ashram said to dance to the departed, to sway 
with what still clung of this spirit of music. maybe I’ll ditch the ledgers 
I’ve been preparing and just tune his thought to the music that flourished 
through him. maybe Nietzsche wasn’t off range when clipping spirit to 
music, trolling after tragedy. That would be one “reason” to switch on the 
music channel when conferring with or even about Philippe. anyway, in 
his magisterial work, Musica Ficta, Philippe himself says that the question 
of music is never a question of music alone.
 The other reason to go the way of Le chant des muses now (even 
though in one of his articles Jean-christophe Bailly wonders if we can even 
say “chant” any longer or revive the spirit of poetry in terms of song or 
Gesang)—the other “reason” was that Philippe in this work often and by 
means of subtle protocols precedes the age of reason—precedes himself, in 
avITal roNell 
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a way, since he was the most reasonable of daseins I have known and his 
elaborations were always, if one can say this, severely reasoned. This other 
reason which, paradoxically, renders him even more reasonable, was that 
I felt he could communicate with my age, which to date has not achieved 
the age of reason, but crawls at sometimes childish levels of incomprehen-
sion, gasping for the breath of understanding. my need for starting over, 
my resetting compulsion, are colossal, the only large-scale quality that I 
can display about myself. So he crouches to my level, gets small without 
talking down. he addresses children, teaching philosophy, introducing 
music. Teaching children, he addresses me, I say to myself, instigating a 
minority report, allowing my regressions and confusions, my still ortho-
dox philosophical experience of astonishment. he licenses the children’s 
menu of thaumazein, enlisting a vocabulary of original bewilderment (my 
German colleagues prostrate themselves before this word, adoring it un-
ambivalently, for once), basing his carefully worded assertions on what in 
another context I trace to the weighted conjunction of stupor as it crosses 
over into stupidity. clearly another story and altogether inappropriate for 
a commemorative text, the matter of stupidity, even though it’s point blank 
on the side of the death drive. also, it reminds me how Philippe would not 
hesitate to say things like, “I have no idea what he’s getting at,” when for 
instance I queried him on a philosopheme in deleuze, or when he claimed 
confusion over levinas’s “otherwise”-directed apportionment of being.2 
But that was on the side of knowledge, so “confusion” would be going too 
far: Philippe saw no reason for reserving an “otherwise” zone for being: 
“mais c’est l’être,” he said to me insisting on the expansive range of being, 
2 here’s the story as it was told to me: Philippe had claimed semi-publicly in Strasbourg that he couldn’t 
understand what levinas was getting at with “otherwise than Being,” and he voiced his consternation 
quite vociferously in a semi-public discussion at the university. In the next days levinas himself was 
coming to lecture at Strasbourg and Jean-luc asked Philippe to pick him up at the train station. Philippe 
balked, saying levinas would surely ask for an explication of Philippe’s stance and he’d prefer not to con-
front him with his own difficult presence at the moment of arrival. Nonsense, Jean-luc is to have retorted. 
Just go pick him up, he’s not heard about your ostensible falling out yet, which you can elaborate patiently 
at the proper occasion. Plus the train station is just a few minutes’ ride from the university. Philippe goes 
to pick up levinas at the train station. It was a Friday afternoon, if I recall correctly. In any case there was 
a considerable traffic jam and they were stuck in the car. levinas turns to Philippe saying he understands 
that they are in dispute. would Philippe kindly explain himself. horns are blaring, nothing’s budging, 
Philippe finds himself obligated to respond to the great sage.
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and when, ridesharing with levinas in a traffic jam, they had all the time 
for levinas to force him to say something. Stupefaction and cognition 
were often substitutable for Philippe, I realize, because taking the stance of 
not knowing or not understanding meant only that he understood all too 
well. 
Still, when I once set out to provoke him in Berkeley, trying to stir 
trouble in my hysterical ingrate inexcusable betrayal kind of way—my 
style of responding shamelessly to the generosity and incomparable light 
of my friend—I told him that I had just read a passage in Paul de man 
stating without frills or excuses that lacoue-labarthe had approached Ni-
etzsche as a first-timer, with undisguised naiveté. Philippe reflected for a 
minute, maybe he blinked, and then said, simply: “that’s not wrong.” his 
probity was every time unimpeachable—no matter how hard I tried to 
find the loophole or to pry open a wounding dossier. he was in a way 
steady on his feet. “don’t be frightened because I have just pronounced 
this word: philosophy. It surely gives the appearance of being a big word, 
quite impressive. But philosophy itself, like everything else, is something 
that can be learned, a step at a time; and it’s not as difficult as you may im-
agine. all you need to know, for starters is a couple of very simple things. 
and understand how they function. It’s the beginning, as always, that’s re-
ally important.” lacoue-labarthe teaches the kids the names of the muses, 
the Greek origins of philosophical thought, and, for good measure, throws 
in some baby language theory. reading along I consider how Philippe has 
offered my contemporaries and me, in Kleinian terms, “a good feed,” a 
reassuring way to grasp the most recalcitrant of theoretical themes. I was 
thinking how in some respects, he had babied me intellectually—and he 
himself looked like a baby, I tell myself! he was such a baby, so world-class 
needy, but this is getting me off track.
what could this mean, that lacoue-labarthe babied some of his 
most earnest readers? well, I recall how he took us through the toughest 
neighborhoods of questioning with unprecedented gentleness. he had a 
way of taking you by the hand as he cosseted fierce commentary. he had 
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access to catastrophic insight and commanded a grammar of the mimetic 
hell to which we westerners have been sent; yet, he operated these reg-
isters of knowing with discretion and calm. maybe his statements didn’t 
pass de manian inspection because of the patterns of understated utter-
ances of which he proved capable. There was a firm tonality but on the 
level of redescription he was at times unassuming, steady but modest, clear 
about his hesitations, reserved. For these reasons, I think, people have said, 
as if this could be calculated and judged absolutely—and maybe it can, I 
won’t foreclose the possibility but make it instead a matter of taste—that 
they prefer Jean-luc to Philippe. People had a tendency to say this, behind 
their backs and once or twice up in their faces. The split in tonalities wasn’t 
hard to decode. Nancy dazzles and rips; Philippe keeps it low (which lets 
itself be confused with methodical, though I can’t deny that he is at times 
methodical, crystal clear methodical); Jean-luc takes risks, Philippe con-
ceals his ever more subdued feats of risk-taking. Perhaps Philippe has in-
vited implicit comparativity ever since he joined Jean-luc after they de-
cided, as they each told me on separate occasions, that they could not live 
apart, which is why they zoomed in on Strasbourg (where they were both 
hired by the same department, which could not have happened in Paris—
this fact has led to speculation among a number of us about the fate of 
“French theory,” how the cartography and emphasis might have changed 
if, for example, Jean-luc had been stationed in some Paris university, then 
his reputation would have matched up strongly with that of deleuze, long 
ago. If there were space for this, and I could indulge derridean expanses, I 
would move now toward considerations of material mappings, surveying 
for instance what it meant that heidegger refused to budge from home 
and cancelled the call from Berlin as he puts forth in his “why we remain 
in the Provinces,” which I have more or less covered in good faith in the 
book Stupidity, or what we can make, on another level, of the transfers and 
homesteading of outstanding scholars from France to the United States, 
the waves that migrant intellectuals have created in academic history in 
terms of the yet uncharted displacements of Germans and Brits, Islanders, 
argentineans, africans, or what derrida has criticized when we say “the 
rest of the world.” 
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Philippe and Jean-luc, in order to maintain their house of being 
stayed back in Strasbourg, where I, like so many, first met them before 
california became for a long while our shared haunt, and then lately we 
had spread to Paris and New York, while Jean-luc remained in Strasbourg, 
practically commuting to Paris. But I have wanted to say something about 
Philippe’s language of discretion, the firm ethicity of his gentle yet high im-
pact articulations that changed the world for some of us, rendering thought 
in essential ways possible. he babied us, but only in the way that the reality 
principle goes after you and slaps you down from early on. Pampered, reali-
ty, pampered, reality: smack, smack. Philippe in some ways was an explorer 
of the possible, he rigorously remained on this side of facticity. So it may 
not be the derridean impossibles that he took on, which is precisely what 
may have led derrida himself to confront the work of lacoue-labarthe by 
entering into the vast registry of his philosophical and poetical reflections 
the thought of désistance. Philippe’s work desists; it practices desistance 
rather than leaping off directly from the energies of resistance or outright 
language rebellion, the permanent insurrection to which we’ve become ac-
customed by lyotard, Kofman, cixous, and deleuze. Still, the purported 
shift from resistance to desistance is more modulated and concealed than 
my description accounts for here—there is far more hesitancy and quasi-
dialectical maneuvering around stated axioms of reluctance. The rhetorical 
flavor of desistance correlates, it seems to me, with lacoue-labarthe’s na-
tive reserve and careful accounting, his nearly primal ethnicity, if such a 
clash of figures can be sustained. desistance in the context of his writing, 
added on to the heideggerian vocabulary of Entfernung, the withdrawal 
that makes itself, produces a non-negative turn or style, not far from the 
fateful phrasing of “I prefer not to.” derrida writes: “without being nega-
tive, or being subject to a dialectic, [desistance] both organizes and disor-
ganizes what it appears to determine.” lacoue-labarthe, in any case, builds 
many key moves of his argument on the subtle propulsion of the de-, which 
derrida situates as part of a hyperbologic characteristic of this oeuvre. 
 For my part, I suddenly realize, I have long lingered in the vicin-
ity of the abyssal pull of such terms as déconstitution, dépropriation, as well 
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as disintallation in Philippe’s specific usage. Several courses that I gave in 
the Berkeley years, side by side with Philippe, were bound by the title and 
orientation “depropriation,” under which we studied the loss of the proper 
in a number of hyperventilating texts (rousseau, Nietzsche, Bernhard), 
though some of them were quiet, calm, even passive about their disap-
proprating fatalities (eckermann, dickinson, wheatley). about the de- 
words, Philippe was among the very few to stick up in L’imitation des mod-
ernes, for the oft discarded usage of “deconstruct”—a word that he does 
not consider “in the least ‘worn out,’” but sees in it the pressure of a task, 
sometimes an imperative or event. I am winding down, now, I can feel it, 
pressured by page limits and other materialities—I have to reread every-
thing, put it in some order, start writing up the columns and ledgers and 
vocabularies that in this numbed phase of shock are just swirling around, 
at random, in a disassociated way. maybe I’ve followed the hölderlinian 
path that much of Philippe’s work depends on, the ex-zentrische Bahn or 
eccentric path, deviating from the start, off centering, for which any rela-
tion to this work calls. or maybe I released myself to the custody of a 
haunting statement that he has made and that has captivated me ever since 
I first encountered it: Philippe links music, the musical drive, whether he 
means the blues or wagner or “the rest of ” his impressive contemporary 
repertory, with the autobiographical compulsion—a compulsion to speak, 
to tell, to venture even the unsayable. as a registered obsessional neurotic, 
I take my cues from such statements, they bind themselves to me as in-
junctions, forcing me to play them out, follow a score, even in bereaved 
pianissimo, quiet, quiet. 
I didn’t get to some of the children’s questions in Le chant des muses. 
They ask him wonderfully aggressive, poignant, determined questions to 
which he responds with an exceptional grace, opening himself to another 
register of exposure. I recognize him in these moments, I can feel him 
breathing and smoking and looking out from his glasses, almost dumb-
founded, by the stuporous request for knowledge. he was always there, 
even when confined to bed, to take our call. we have lost a friend, I tell 
myself, a world has gone down but what’s left—“was bleibet aber”—is a 
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him: hölderlin, the Greeks, Nietzsche, heidegger all acquired the dignity 
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The gathering of recalling thought is not based on a  
human capacity, such as the capacity to remember and retain.  
all thinking that recalls what can be recalled in thought already  
lives in that gathering which beforehand has in its keeping  
and keeps hidden all that remains to be thought.
-






In my uncertainty of attempting to respond to the call of mourning, to 
respond to mourning even though I had no certainty of not only whether I was 
doing so but more pertinently that I was attempting to do so whilst having no 
way of being certain what mourning was to begin with, I must have sent out 
a call. and my dear teacher and friend, avital ronell, must have picked up on 
my distress. For, she sent me her thoughts and her work of mourning, for and 
on Philippe lacoue-labarthe. and as I was voraciously pouring, almost tear-
ing, through her work, in the hope—nearing desperation—of sinking my teeth 
into something that would guide me, help me, let me cling on to a particular 
certainty, what emerged from it was a certain calm, a certain friendship. 
In attempting to attend to the voice of Philippe, her friendship with 
Philippe, in letting his thought foreground itself, thinking with him rather 
than for him, what occurred—is still occurring—was a resounding, a playful 
bouncing off, on and with each other, where there was a collision, a rebound-
ing, a sounding of the two voices, both distinct, and yet never quite apart, 
resonating, reverberating without any attempt to be first—even though there 
was no choice but to be the one that is speaking, writing, for him, in his 
absence, in his memory, for his memory. 
There was neither prima donna nor primo uomo; just music. 
and what brought me some measure of comfort—even as it became 
more apparent that one can only mourn, that one perhaps only mourns whilst 
responding; thus never quite knowing what is calling one to mourn—was that 
writing, thinking, can be personal, warm, human. 
-
as I dashed for help, one can never quite forget—keep out of one’s 
mind—that in searching, in pleading, in asking, there is always a chance that 
one’s hopes might be dashed. For, even if the call is answered, even if the other 
attempts to attend to it, there is no, never any, guarantee that the response 
might have anything to do with the call. In some way, a call for, call to, a call-
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distress call
ing, and its response, might always be separated by a dash— 
But it is not as if this dash, this cut, caesura, is absolute as well: it is 
also a connection to another, the other, a point of touch. and here, we can 
never forget that in order to touch there has to be some distance—if we are 
too close, in the same place, we are already consuming, subsuming, the other, 
one another. 
do we only dash to another if there is something in them, an ele-
ment in them, of them—even and perhaps especially if this element remains 
veiled—that we find dashing? 
-
a register of the call that cannot be ignored, even as much as one may wish 
to, is its potentially accusatory nature. For, one is called by something, someone; 
and more precisely, one is called to answer (that very call itself). here, we can 
hear an echo of one being called to the stand, being called to stand, being called 
to testify to something, someone; and there is no reason why this testimony is not 
of one’s very self. In being called to testify, one could also be called to defend—in 
being called to the stand, one could well be defending an accusation. In standing 
against that accusation, one could be called to answer for a crime that one didn’t 
even commit in the first place; a crime that one is now compelled to answer for 
because one had had the gumption (or it might have been instinctive, un-thought, 
accidental even) to answer the call.
here, we catch a glimpse of the problem K. faces in The Trial: whether 
he had actually committed the crime or not is unknown (and perhaps un-
important); what is more crucial is that he is called to answer, account for, a 
crime, and more precisely a crime that he remains blind to. after all, it is not 
as if one does not break the law numerous times each day—the trouble is that 
in attempting to account for a crime that remains veiled from us, we inadvert-
ently end up admitting to even more crimes. Perhaps anything that we say, or 
do, can be used against us. 
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So, even as we are attempting to answer, we might actually be confess-
ing, opening ourselves to even more accusations as we try to respond. and here 
we might recall hélène cixous’ recollection in Portrait of Jacques Derrida as a 
Young Jewish Saint, where she meditates on the paradox that is a confession: 
“here I should recall why we confess to God who knows, cur confitemur Deo 
scienti, why we only truly confess ourselves to God-who-knows because he 
knows it is not a question of knowing; and on condition: on condition there is 
no other witness than God-who-knows, on condition we make our confession 
to no one other than God, therefore to No one, to God-who-knows-as-like-
wise-he-does-not-know, to God the ear for my word, God as my very own ear 
into which, out my silence, I thrust my avowal, aloud, in order to hear myself 
and (not) be heard by anyone else (other than God).”1 [This is especially true 
since the very person we are speaking to, speaking for, responding to, is already 
dead, already knows that (s)he is dead—our testimony of her life is about her, 
and also never for her; (s)he is the last person that needs our testimony; it is her 
life, and (s)he is the one that has led it, knows more about it than the one who 
is uttering, testifying.] For, if you both have to know (to confess), and cannot 
know (who you are confessing to) at the same time, not only is it always a leap 
of faith since the object of confession is not as important as the fact that one is 
confessing, all confession is no longer in the realm of truth-falsity. By confess-
ing, one is doing nothing but testifying to the fact one is confessing. and more-
over, one can only testify if one is unsure of the facts (otherwise no testimony is 
needed). and since the testimony comes through you—another cannot testify 
on your behalf—one has no real choice but to narrate one’s testimony; bringing 
with it all the problems of forgetting, and ultimately, fictionality. 
In speaking, is one confessing the need to confess, confessing the very 
inadequateness of one’s confession, confessing that one has no means to ad-
dress the one who is lying there other than by confessing? 
In confessing, is what is being confessed the very notion of confession 
itself? after all, it is not as if the penance ever matches—or was even intended 
1 hélène cixous. Portrait of Jacques Derrida as a Young Jewish Saint. trans. Beverly Bie Brahic. (New York: 
columbia University Press), 2004: 48.
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to match—the sin confessed. It is an act of contrition, a rite; and what is being 
confessed is what is being confessed—what I have said, I have said. 
“For those whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven; for those 
whose sins you retain, they are retained.” -John 19:23
This opens the question of whether there is an unconfessable act (leav-
ing aside the nature of this act itself). This is not the same question of whether 
the confession is pardonable, forgivable. In a way, this question comes before 
that: for, without a confession, there can be no opening for forgiveness. which 
is not to say that it is a matter of phases, procedure—if that were so, forgive-
ness would be reduced to a mere function; an affect to a cause. and in many 
instances, a confession and the call for forgiveness come almost simultane-
ously, as if the call were already part of the confession itself. This suggests that 
the confessibility of an act has little to nothing to do with the result—response 
even—to the confession. we could claim that the onus lies solely on the con-
fessor—but this would not be completely true, too; one can only “truly confess 
to [someone] who already knows.” and this opens the register that one can 
only confess if the other is also willing to hear one’s confession—perhaps re-
gardless of whether there is, or eventually will be, forgiveness involved.
But what happens when this other is also dead? 

how do I mourn thee?
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Not you, for that would remind me too much of a you, a person—not a person 
as such but one in relation with all others, every other. But thee, a personal, 
one that is just one as one, singular.
But since you are gone, the one that I am attempting to mourn is al-
ways already in my memory, remembered. which fragment of you have I res-
urrected? Is it even possible to speak of thee as such any longer? or perhaps 
it is this fragmented, fragmentary, nature of the remembrance that ensures 
every memory is singular. Not that I am necessarily able to tell the difference 
between them. For, each recollection of thee, you, is haunted by the possibility 
of forgetting. and since there is no object to forgetting, no referentiality—all 
I can possibly articulate is the fact that I might have forgotten—there is no 
possibility of knowing what is being forgotten. There is no possibility of know-
ing if each time one remembers, each moment of memory might bring with 
it forgetting as well. In other words, forgetting is not always in an antonymic 
relationality with memory, both are possibly a part of each other. 
Not only can I not know if my resurrection of thee is accurate, it might 
not even have anything to do with thee. It might be a you—not just in relation 
with all others, every other, but a you that is completely other. 
Perhaps all I can mourn is the possibility of thee. 
Perhaps all that allows me to mourn in the first place is the possibility 
that I have forgotten, am always forgetting, thee.
Perhaps then, all I can mourn is you. 
any act of memory, any recalling, is an attempt to respond to some-
thing which, someone who has, left a trace in one. here, it is not too difficult 
to hear an echo of the eternal request, that of “do this in memory of me.” This 
opens the register of what kind of memory is one being asked to recall? For, it is 
not as if Jesus of Nazareth did not have a notion of how he would have liked 
to be remembered by his disciples: the trouble is that none of them were—or 
37
how do I mourn thee?
could ever be—privy to that particular notion. This was most clearly seen in 
the vastly different reaction of Judas Iscariot from the other eleven at the scene 
of the request. what this calls into question is the notion of the relationality 
between the author and the reader; of whether the author has any control over 
what the reader reads, is reading, has read. 
It is not difficult to hear an echo of authority in author; as if the writer 
of the situation can play at being God—all-seeing, and in full control. The 
trouble with authority is that it is always already illegitimate. For, if something 
is legitimate, access to it would be open to everyone—governed by a universal 
law. It is only when something is illegitimate that the authority of a person is 
required to enact it. For instance, a death-sentence can only be pardoned by 
the authority of the sovereign. In doing so (s)he is going against the legal sys-
tem which sentenced that person to death; the same legal system that upholds 
her very sovereignty. In other words, authority is the very undoing of the law. 
however, a foregrounding of the illegitimacy of the sovereign would not only 
shatter the illusion, but also bring about the collapse of the entire system. af-
ter all, it is not as if one can read without the figure of the author: even if one 
posits that the author is dead, a spectral presence—even as a fiction, perhaps 
especially as a fiction—has to be maintained; otherwise the fantasy of the text 
that can be approached, that can possibly be read, crumbles. The very source 
of that authority—of why someone has authority, and more than that, why we 
grant authority to someone, thereby necessitating our subjectification to that 
figure who only has the authority due to our self-subjectification—remains 
outside of reason, remains unknown; remains a secret. 
after all, it is not as if we can ever know what “me” is. 
we should remember that this statement takes place in the scene of 
trans-substantiation. and this reopens the register of remembering and for-
getting: for, this is a process where there is a change in substance of the bread 
and wine (into the body and blood of christ), but one which the senses are not 
privy to. In other words, this is change in substance, but one in which there is 
no referentiality; and this unverifiable, and ultimately illegitimate, trans-sub-
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stantiation is only possible due to the potentiality of forgetting. For, if memory 
was complete—if one could know for sure—then by extension, possibility is 
governed by correspondence: the fact that we can never be sure, that we can 
never control forgetting, suggests the possibility of changes occurring whilst 
remaining exterior to our cognition, to our scope of knowing. But here we 
must go even further and examine what occurs even when there is the pos-
sibility of referentiality. 
In order to do so, we have to consider what it means to say ‘_________
is like _________’, that ‘something is like something else’; for, the statement 
of relationality is the very basis of all correspondence. whenever one utters 
‘_________ is like _________’, there is always already the echo of preference 
that haunts the statement; that this relationality is uttered only because the 
one who utters it wants it to be so. whether it is a biased statement or not 
is irrelevant; what is crucial is the fact that this statement would not exist—
this relationality would not be—if it were not called into being by that person. 
however, in order for the person to call this relationality into being, (s)he would 
have to first assume the possibility of this very relationality itself; it is only 
retrospectively that the validity of the statement ‘_________ is like _________’ 
can be tested. hence, this is a statement that is based on nothing but the as-
sumption of the possibility that ‘_________ is like _________’. In other words, 
this statement of relationality is not a statement of reference, of correspond-
ence, but the very naming of referentiality itself: in order to make the state-
ment, one must first assume the possibility of referentiality; and the statement 
‘_________ is like _________’ is its very name. In terms of reading, each time 
one reads, one is opening a connection to the other, and more specifically 
naming the very possibility of this connection itself. as avital ronell reminds 
us, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimila-
tion, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading.”1 each time you 
“do this in memory of me,” you are doing nothing but reading—attempting to 
read—what “me” is.
 
1 avital ronell. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech. (lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press), 1989: 380. 
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[we should try not to forget that the term like comes from lich, which 
etymologically can be traced to corpse. here, one might open the register that 
we call the oeuvre of an author her body of work. one should note, though, that 
etymologically speaking, there is no specific mention of the body in the term: 
it traces itself back to opus, or work. hence, the body that we are referring to 
might well be that of the author—the work that is written on her self. Perhaps, 
then, the “me” that we are asked to remember is not only the text to be read, it 
is also the text that is being written each time we are attempting to read it. For, 
it is not as if we are privy to the author, to the authoring, of that text. It is not as 
if we can ever tell if it is we who are authoring as we are reading, or even if there 
was an authoring: perhaps the authoring is precisely in the reading of the text.
one might even consider the fact that this scene happens twice—once 
with the body, and once with the blood. Perhaps there is always already the 
recognition that there is more than one memory, there is more than one “me” 
to be remembered. and even if they are contrasting, complementary, perhaps 
contradictory, memories, they form part of a “me” that can never (at least with 
any certainty) be whole. here, we might go further and speculate that it is 
precisely the duality of the situation that is crucial: if there is only one, single, 
“me” to be remembered, once this happens, all need for memory is over—it is 
only the duality, the potential uncertainty, the duel in, and of, memories that 
maintains the need to “do this in memory of me.”]
we might also want to consider what kind of statement “do this in 
memory of me” is. If it is an order, this reopens our considerations of the law. 
For, if it is an imperative from Jesus of Nazareth, and his disciples are not 
privy to the intent of his command, they are facing a situation where they 
are affected by a law, one which has effects on them, but which they remain 
blind to. hence, each attempt to respond to his command is one where they 
are stumbling around in the dark. If we posit that it is a request, that doesn’t 
change the fact that none of the twelve know what they are responding to: 
what is opened though is the notion that Jesus of Nazareth already pre-empts 
the possibility that they were going to forget him the moment he was dead. 
[one might claim that the only reason the Nazarene had to command them to 
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“do this in memory of me” is that he knew they would otherwise forget him.] 
what is perhaps more interesting is if we consider the notion that Jesus of 
Nazareth knows that forgetting him is inevitable: that all they could possibly 
have is a certain memory of him. In this way, “do this in memory of me” is a 
soft plea. and more than that, it is a remembering of him that has to take place 
through a ritual. For, rituals are meaningless: but it is precisely through set ges-
tures, a series of rites, that his disciples might be able to resurrect a particular, 
singular, memory—different each time—of him. and it is in this manner that 
he is able to live, not by cheating death, but precisely by dying. It is only due to 
the fact that his disciples forget him that Jesus of Nazareth is able to die to live. 
But it is not as if even a ritual will allow us to respond to a memory in 
full; not that we can even know what a full memory is. remembering only ever 
occurs in exception to memory—quite possibility in betrayal of a memory. In 
this way, each remembrance is a naming of that memory, a naming of some-
thing as memory, bringing with it an act of violence, especially since there 
is no basis to the naming except for the naming. each time one names, one 
is picking one name over every other name; privileging one name whilst all 
other(s) are marginalized. however, this is a violence that is not an effacement 
as there is no claim to the validity of this naming; this is precisely because each 
act of naming is a tautological gesture, one that makes no claim to reason, to 
logic, to truth, but remains in the realm of doxa, opinion. 
even though it is of doxa, one cannot do away with the fact that each 
naming is a betrayal of all other names. If anything, it might actually increase 
it: after all, if there is no Grund, one is choosing a particular path, making a 
certain decision, based on nothing but the fact that one is. 
as I attempt to mourn thee, even if I can mourn only you, I have no 
choice but to name you, give the mourning a name. at the same time, in 
choosing to mourn thee, I have to betray thee—in memory of thee. 
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“Before you die you’re a bastard. After that, you’re a fucking saint …” 
-maUrIce JameS BeINS
how is one supposed to write a eulogy for a man who opens a challenge to 
the very premise of all eulogies? For, eulogies are a discourse of praise, wherein 
one is supposed to only utter good words about someone; as if in their absence 
they can do no wrong. and perhaps it is this that he so succinctly captures: it 
is only because the person is now absent that (s)he can do no wrong. In this 
sense, the term “living saint” can only be an oxymoron—even as a figure of 
speech, it tends to be applied only to persons that are not actually in our vicin-
ity; and they usually are people that we don’t, or at least hardly, even know.
one might even posit that it is because we don’t know them that we 
can say only good things about them—the more one knows someone, even if 
we take into consideration all the problems of knowing, the greater the likeli-
hood of encountering something about them that we dislike, quite possibly for 
no other reason than taste, or bias. hence, in order to eulogise someone, one 
has no choice but to adopt a deliberate blindness towards the person, towards 
aspects of what makes that person a person. In other words, we have to adopt 
a particular distance when we are making a priori selections of that person. 
In order to eulogise, we have to first make the person not only an object 
(one that we can dissect, separate neatly), we also have to make her a stranger. 
at the very least, this opens a register on friendship—specifically a 
type of friendship that is needed in order to write a eulogy. For, it both requires 
a closeness, a familiarity, and at the same time a particular kind of separa-
tion from the friend. and this reopens a thinking of a kind of betrayal that is 
needed for a eulogy—where one has to betray a certain side of a friend in order 
to be their friend. here, we can hear an echo of Plutarch, who in the opening 
of his biography Alexander the Great writes, “it must be borne in mind that 
my design is not to write histories, but lives.”1 one can immediately detect his 
1 Plutarch. The Life of Alexander the Great. trans. John dryden. (New York: The modern library), 2004: 3.
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distinction between writing lives, which composes of particular narratives 
with their underlying tropes, from an attempt an to encompass, master, a mul-
tiplicity of tales, some of which would be contrary to what he is trying to con-
vey. But perhaps what is more important to us here (at the risk of a Plutarchian 
gesture whilst commenting on him) is Plutarch’s acknowledgment of his role 
in writing the biography, that the alexander of Alexander the Great is his.
one could, of course, see it as an effacing gesture, even an arrogant 
one: as if the writer’s perspective is more important than the reality of the life 
one is writing on, about. however, if we consider the notion that reality always 
already escapes us, slips all attempts to capture, eludes knowing—reopening 
echoes of the illegitimacy of authorship—does the writer have any choice but 
to enact a particular violence whilst writing? moreover, reality itself implies a 
certain grasping, seizing, of some parts, certain particularities—whilst ceas-
ing, enacting a caesura on, others. In this sense, by foregrounding his role as 
the author, Plutarch is acknowledging a responsibility not only towards his 
text, but also to alexander himself—by recognizing, accepting, that there is 
a particular purpose in telling these particular tales; eulogising alexander as 
the great one.
The trouble, though, is that one can only write: whether whatever is 
written is read, or heard, as praise is a completely different matter. as alberto 
manguel reminds us in his text on his friend Jorge luis Borges, even with the 
best of intentions, “even in the realm of friendship, the role of the reader pre-
dominates. The reader, not the writer.”2
For, one can only write in an attempt to write. writing comes to one—
from somewhere else, everywhere else, anywhere else; often in spite of one self. 
hence, even as all writing can only happen through the self, the self is—and 
can only be—the medium through which it occurs. The only thing that one 
can do is attempt to respond, attend, to the possibility of writing itself. By be-
ing in front of a keyboard, by having a notebook on me. By reading. all craft 
2 alberto manguel. With Borges. (london: Telegram Books), 2006: 60.
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is a form of mimesis; and writing often begins with reading something, any-
thing. after which one might be able to form a certain relationality between 
what is read and what is being written. But it is not as if every mimesis is 
writing. even though there is no verifiable difference between a grammatically 
correct sentence and a piece of writing, one can only know the difference the 
moment it is read, perhaps only at the point of reading itself. 
Being open to possibilities means that one has to concede that one is 
never quite in control of one’s thoughts, one’s writing. Sometimes, whatever is 
written is strange, unfamiliar, other, to one—a fragment of one. 
and since one can never quite control how it will be read, one can only 
write, read, and leave it to be read. 
which opens the possibility that whenever one is attempting to write 
a eulogy, it might always already be written for one self; and more specifically 
the self in one that is one’s own reader. For, as Jacques derrida so poignantly 
reflects in his eulogy for roland Barthes: “he will receive nothing of what I 
say here of him, for him, to him, beyond the name but still within it, as I pro-
nounce his name that is no longer his. This living attention here comes to tear 
itself towards that which, or the one who, can no longer receive it; it rushes 
towards the impossible. But if his name is no longer his, was it ever? I mean 
simply, uniquely?”3
So, even as we write-speak a discourse of praise in his name, what con-
tinues to haunt the discourse is his very name; and whether the name that is 
uttered in the very attempt to eulogise him is even his name any longer. hence, 
not only do we have to take up the position of stranger yet friend, more per-
tinently, we end up having to cast him as a stranger to himself; his very own 
name only highlights the fact that it is no longer him that we are speaking of. 
“when I say roland Barthes it is certainly him whom I name, him beyond 
his name. But since he himself is now inaccessible to this appellation, since 
3 Jacques derrida. The Work of Mourning. trans. Pascale-anne Brault and michael Nass. (chicago: University 
of chicago Press), 2003: 45.
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this nomination cannot become a vocation, address, or apostrophe (suppos-
ing that this possibility revoked today could have ever been pure), it is him 
in me that I name, toward him in me, in you, in us that I pass through his 
name. what happens around him and is said about him remains between us. 
mourning began at this point. But when? For even before the unqualifiable 
event called death, interiority (of the other in me, in you, in us) had already 
begun its work.”4 
In saying “maurice James Beins,” I have no choice but to name him in 
spite of the impossibility of naming him; in saying his name, I am naming the 
fact that it is impossible to name him. Perhaps all that I am naming is the fact 
that ever since I have known his name, I have been doing nothing but prepar-
ing to name him; in preparing to name him, I have been doing nothing but 
starting to mourn the day where there is nothing I can do but say his name. 
and since I can only say his name, even as his name is other to me, 
and potentially to himself, this suggests that we can only utter his name as a 
citation to himself. In other words, “maurice James Beins”—as in the case of 
“roland Barthes”—is a quotation to himself, even as much as the referentiality 
of this citation remains unstable. 
here, we might momentarily want to keep in mind the potential ques-
tion that accompanies all citation, all quotations: is one choosing a quotation, a 
thinker, a kind of thinking, because one likes it, because it happens to suit one at 
that particular moment? This opens various registers of citationality: whether 
we are citing to pay a certain homage, an acknowledgement that the thought 
comes from another, from elsewhere; whether we are deferring to another; 
whether that moment of deference brings with it a shielding of ourselves, as if 
to say, if you have an issue with that thought, don’t argue with me; pick your fight 
with the other. By uttering the name of the person we are attempting to praise, 




and even as we are attempting to consider the notion of preference—
even to guard against it for fear that biasness may cloud our thinking—we 
cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there are effects on our corporeal being, 
perhaps even affecting our very thinking. For, even as we may be attempting 
to fortify ourselves as we pay homage, praise, to the person, we cannot escape 
the fact that it is us who not only pick the particular stories to tell, it is also our 
very self who is selecting this name to be uttered. 
In other words, even as these utterances are taking place in the form 
of a eulogy—with its specific rules and form regarding what we should say—
these utterances themselves are not entirely divorced from us. 
and if one invokes the notion of form, of what can or cannot be in 
a eulogy, one has to also evoke the notion of precedence, of all the eulogies 
that have come before us. here, it is not difficult to hear an echo of a phrase 
that we have been using rather regularly in the last few minutes; that of “in 
other words.” This opens the question of exactly whose words are we using 
here: since the narrative of a eulogy is usually deemed to correspond with, to, 
the life of the person, these are his words, even as their referentiality remains 
in question. This remains a question not in a sense of did he say—or write—
them (that would be fairly easy to verify, even though one must never forget 
the entire history of mis-attributions that haunt the legitimacy of citations), 
but rather, every citation, attribution, is always already out of context. In this 
sense, whenever we say “in other words,” we are not only pointing out the fact 
that these are not exactly our words, we are also covering, veiling, the notion 
that these are precisely our words—if not in content, then surely in form, in 
sequence—words that are ordered according to our needs, desires. hence, we 
are once again unable to do away with one of our initial concerns: the notion 
of bias, preference. In creating a particular corpus—and here we reopen the 
register of relationality, likeness, bodies—are we always already writing our 
own bodies into it: by evoking the name of whom we eulogise, by resurrecting 
him through a séance of language—by playing medium here—am I always 
already injecting, inseminating, my self into that dissemination? and it is 
no coincidence that the conventional sign of citation—quotation marks—are 
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occasionally referred to as vampire marks—not only do they look like punc-
ture wounds, whenever one quotes one is enacting a violence of context by 
abducting—dragging—out of context. more than that, one is also appropriat-
ing the life, the force (by way of its effects), the energy, of the words, for one’s 
own purposes. 
In other words—for what choice do I have here but to foreground the 
otherness in what I am attempting to say—whatever I am saying, even as much 
as I am attempting to legitimise through, and with, the other, is always already 
haunted by the spectre of illegitimacy. For, even as one—I—is attempting to 
back up what is said with others, I—one—am never able to distinguish which 
are my—one’s—words, from that of the other. hence, it is not just that one 
is unable to tell one self from the other, both one and the other are now also 
potentially indivorceable.
 
and here, if we momentarily reopen the register that all knowledge is a 
form of memory, this suggests that all that we know is a citation, a quotation. 
Since we can never do away with the possibility of forgetting, we will not only 
be uncertain of our knowledge, of what we know, we will also never quite know 
whether what we know is from us, or from another. as hélène cixous reminds 
us, “citation is the voice of the other and it highlights the double playing of the 
narrative authority. we constantly hear the footsteps of the other, the footsteps 
of others in language, others speaking in Stephen’s language or in Ulysses’, I 
mean in the book’s language … It reminds us that we have been caught up in 
citation ever since we said the first words mama or papa.”5 In other words, each 
utterance, every attempt to speak, write, brings with it the notion of otherness. 
hence, the very stability of the I is always already called into question. The 
self and the other can no longer be seen as antonyms. Not only is the self and 
the other in relation with each other, the self is potentially other to itself. The 
potential uncertainty grows if we take into consideration the teaching of Paul 
de man, who never lets us forget that “it is impossible to say where quotation 
ends and ‘truth’ begins, if by truth we understand the possibility of referential 
5 hélène cixous. Stigmata. (london: routledge), 2005: 135. 
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verification. The very statement by which we assert that the narrative is rooted 
in reality can be an unreliable quotation; the very document, the manuscript, 
produced in evidence may point back not to an actual event, but to an endless 
chain of quotations reaching as far back as the ultimate transcendental signi-
fied God, none of which can lay claim to referential authority.”6 In this manner, 
it is impossible to distinguish a moment of reading from a potential re-writing. 
and since reading and writing are haunted by illegitimacy—both ultimately 
lacking any necessary referent—all reading is a potential writing (which can 
only happen if all writing is also a reading of sorts). 
In other words, not only is the name of the other—the name of “mau-
rice James Beins”—other to himself, one’s words are also always already poten-
tial other to oneself.
and if one is ultimately unable to distinguish between reading and re-
writing, one can never legitimise one’s eulogy. at best, all one can say is, “what 
I have written, I have written.”
“Quod scripsi, scripsi.” PoNTIUS PIlaTe, John 22:19
why the double statement? why the need to reinforce—shouldn’t once 
be enough, especially when it is coming from an official of the roman empire? 
does one repeat when one is sure, when one reinforces the fact that one is sure, 
or does it also open a question on one’s own certainty; where the second half is 
an attempt to reassure both the listener, and perhaps more pertinently the one 
who utters, of the legitimacy of what he has written, what I have written. one 
cannot divorce what Pilate has written from the law: after all, what he writes is 
the law—the Nazarene is indeed King because of his statement, “Iesus Nazare-
nus, Rex Iudaeorum.” here, one can reopen the register that Pilate is the author 
of the law, bringing with it all the illegitimacy of authoring, authority; that he 
is indeed writing the law as he is reading it.7 one might also speculate why 
6 Paul de man. Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. (New 
haven: Yale University Press), 1979: 204.
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he chooses to focus on the fact that he has written it. even though the legal 
form requires a written aspect, the foregrounding of writing in his utterance 
opens a consideration of “Iesus Nazarenus, Rex Iudaeorum” being a truth that 
he could write, but not speak. For, if this were a dangerous truth—one cannot 
ignore the fact that he was in Jerusalem, and the notion that the Nazarene was 
their King was not exactly a popular one—then it is curious that it is recorded, 
in writing, permanent, as opposed to uttered, and potentially transient. here 
though, we might want to consider the notion that utterances, speech, high-
light the presence of the elocutioner; one is conversely always able to take a 
certain distance towards what is written—Pilate is, in fact, able to claim that 
he is merely repeating, recording, the words of the Nazarene himself; words 
from a response that was an echo of his own words, that of “it is you who say I 
am.” In a way, Pilate’s writing is a recording of a loop—a remix if you will—of 
a title that is bounced back and forth between himself and Jesus of Nazareth. 
[here, let us risk a side-track, and tune into the role of dJ Pontius Pi-
late. In recording a remixed version of the response of the Nazarene, he opens 
it up to reading. This is not to say that speech does not need to be read, but 
there is a lower likelihood that the Pharisees were going to directly question 
the pronouncement of a roman official. once written for all to see, though, 
one could claim to be seeking clarification on a hermeneutical level—this we 
see when the chief priests said to Pilate: “You should not write ‘King of the 
Jews’, but rather, ‘this man said: I am King of the Jews’”8—or even clarity for the 
writer himself, when he re-reads what he has written. however, in opening his 
7 Take for instance a situation at a pedestrian light-controlled intersection. a policeman who has seen you 
crossing the road whilst the light turns red mid-way can summon you both for not stopping, and also for 
stopping. either way, you are infringing the law. This is true even though the law itself is not consistent. 
For, there are basically two lights—green to signal “go,” and red to signal “stop.” The problem lies in the fact 
that “green” is an invitation (one can choose to walk, or not to, whenever green is showing), whilst ‘red’ is 
an order, an imperative (when the red light is on, one has no choice but to stop). To compound matters, if 
one is crossing the road (whilst the light is green, so no law is being broken) and the light suddenly turns 
to red, one cannot stop—in fact, at that point, the thing to do is to run like hell. hence, sometimes one is 
required to break the law in order to follow the law. however, the policeman is the absolute arbiter in this 
case. So, not only does (s)he read your actions to determine if you have followed the law or not, (s)he is also 




words to reading, dJ PP was also opening it to variations, all of them poten-
tially different, perhaps even contradictory: the mix-tapes of the chief priests, 
the people, the disciples of the Nazarene, all possibly had nothing to do with 
each other. which is not to say that each reading affects them any less, nor are 
the effects any less on the dJ himself. For, as (s)he is writing, (s)he is selecting, 
picking, as if conducting an orchestra—where all the musicians, instruments, 
tones—are possibilities of words, letters, combinations, limited only by her 
imagination, her creation, and also a set of rules, laws, grammar; the same 
limitations that the reader, (s)he as her reader, is governed by. and as (s)he is 
playing with these possibilities, so are the readers, so is (s)he as her own other. 
writing—spinning—mixing—reading.
 
and when one hears writing, if one listens carefully, one can also pick 
up on a certain writhing, a slipping, sliding, slithering, in, and with, language. 
and here, one might reopen speculation on the uncomfortable relationality 
between authority and authorship; and the writer having to sneak herself in, 
not just past the reader, but past herself as reader, her reading of herself.] 
This brings us back once again to the repetition, to the double, to the 
return of the same. But what return? we might even venture further and won-
der: what was Pilate wishing would return? considering the situation he was 
in, a colonial ruler surrounded by people who were only turning to him in 
order that they could crucify Jesus of Nazareth—encircled by those who usu-
ally regarded him as the enemy—it is quite plausible that all he wanted was 
for the entire ordeal to be over. For, there is a hint of resignation in his tone, 
a certain weariness in the repetition, a repletion of his will: almost a plea for 
everyone to stop questioning him. one might also consider the notion of the 
realm of questioning being beyond that of the chief priests’ enquiry of the 
validity of Pilate’s statement: it is not inconceivable that the writer himself 
was having doubts about what was surely an unusual statement on his part. 
It is also possible to detect an inflection of a question in the second half of 
“what I have written, I have written”; not in a hermeneutical sense, but more 
pertinently did I really write that? For, there was no way in which Pilate—or 
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anyone—could have verified that Jesus of Nazareth was the King of the Jews: 
it was based on nothing but the response of Jesus to an accusation from Pilate 
himself. In other words, it was a statement based on a claim that was never 
even made—if it came from anywhere, it was from somewhere other to both 
Pilate and Jesus. and if indeed Pilate was responding to a call from elsewhere, 
this was a response to a call that only he was privy to; which might be why after 
he had written what he had written, he was immediately faced with outrage. 
This might be why the statement was tautological: Pilate was actually saying 
nothing in the repetition besides the fact that he was saying something—it 
was a only a response to the question from the chief priest in form. There are 
echoes of Nietzsche here, in particular his teaching that the return of the same 
is rarely, if ever, exactly the same; perhaps only in form. So, even as Pilate 
was repeating himself, there was always already the possibility of something 
exterior to himself in that response, something that even he was not aware of, 
privy to. In other words, the response might well have been for someone, or 
something, other to the chief priests; perhaps even other to himself. which 
reopens the possibility of Pilate responding in writing to a call from powers 
beyond him: after all, the only way in which one can communicate with the 
divine is through a medium; symbolically, ritualistically. 
and this returns us again to the question of writing, of eulogies, and 
the notion of a dedication. For, even as Pilate was probably inscribing the sign 
in relation to Jesus of Nazareth, there was always already the possibility that 
it spoke with, and to, more. even as we—I—write a eulogy with a person in 
mind, I—we—am potentially addressing something other to whom we are at-
tempting to address. 
The question that remains with us, that arises, that perhaps is raised 
as it is the one left behind, is: as the one remaining, how are we able to write 
that eulogy for the one who goes, the one who leaves us behind? This is a ques-
tion not so much of will (s)he receive the eulogy, this testimony (even though it 
is an important and prevalent thought), but one of can one even testify about 
another—can one testify for anyone but another? does one have to be able to 
comprehend the issue at hand in order to be a witness to it; does one have to 
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know in order to witness? and in all of these, there are two factors at play: the 
ability to comprehend, to see, to understand; and the notion of an active role, 
that of choice in testimony, choosing to testify. as Jacques derrida reminds us, 
one of the difficulties of testifying is that, “testimony always goes hand in hand 
with at least the possibility of fiction, perjury, and the lie. were this possibility 
to be eliminated, no testimony would be possible any longer; it could no longer 
have the meaning of testimony.”9 But in order to begin to even contemplate the 
notion of lies, fiction, and possible untruths, we have to first address a more 
basic question, that of what exactly are we are attempting to testify to?; which 
is a question of uncertainty towards the very thing we are witnessing. This is 
crucial as it affects the very basis of one’s ability to witness. For, in order to re-
spond, one must first respond to the notion of one’s relationality with the object 
of one’s response. and hence, all witnessing is always already haunted by the 
question of hermeneutics; at some point all witnessing is subject to the question 
of what does this event that I am witnessing mean? In any attempt to witness, 
one is left with one’s version of the event—in other words, all one can offer is 
one’s interpretive gesture. even if there are others around, the only solace they 
can give is their own interpretations. The event that one is bearing witness to 
is always already past, recalled, called forth, through the very act of testifying 
to it, subject to the subject’s memories, along with all the uncertainty it brings. 
In this manner, witnessing is not so much a gesture of truth or falsity: one is 
ultimately making utterances without any possibility of referentiality, without 
any possibility of knowing whether one is right or not. one is attempting to 
respond to a situation with nothing but the fact that one is witnessing. This 
suggests that every testimony, every act of witnessing, is an act of inscribing, an 
act of writing, narrating. more specifically, it is an act of narrating in the first 
person; for, one can only witness for oneself. and since the narrator has to be 
present at the event in order to narrate, there is always already the problem of 
indiscernability at play; of whether the I of the first person narrative refers to 
the narrator of the tale, or the character that is in the tale. and it is the impos-
sibility of differentiating them at any given moment that continually haunts 
9 Jacques derrida. Demeure: Fiction and Testimony. trans. elizabeth rottenberg. (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press), 2000: 27. 
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every testimony. hence, every act of witnessing, every act of testifying, is always 
already inscribed with the unknowability of whether the witness is recounting a 
tale, or telling it; whether the witness is narrating the tale or telling it as a char-
acter in the tale. For, a narrator would know the entire tale before recounting 
it; a character only knows what is happening at the point it is happening. and 
it is the indistinguishability of the two that leaves the testimony unaware of its 
own status: of whether each utterance is constative or performative. Not only is 
anyone hearing the testimony unable to be certain of the verifiability of what (s)
he is hearing, the testifier herself is also blind to her own testimony. 
The only thing that might be clear is that an attempt, any attempt, to 
testify is caught in an aporia: one can only respond if one knows what one is 
responding to, but at the same time one is unsure—can never be sure—about 
what one is responding to. as Jacques derrida elegantly testifies, this is the 
“distinction between fiction and autobiography that not only remains unde-
cidable but, far more serious, in whose indecidability, as de man makes clear, 
it is impossible to stand, to maintain oneself in a stable or stationary way. one 
thus finds oneself in a fatal and double impossibility: the impossibility of de-
ciding, but the impossibility of remaining in the undecidable.”10 In testifying, 
all one can do is testify, even in the impossibility of doing so; narrate one’s 
tale, keeping in mind the fact that one is absolutely responsible; as all one is 
doing, all one is able to do, is name the event, bringing with it all the problems 
of a name. For, a name is a referent, with all the spectres of its history, its own 
stories, its own tales; at the same time it is always already illegitimate as there 
is no reason anything is named as such except for the fact that it is named 
such. each name is always already tautological, referring to nothing except 
itself, except to the fact that it is so; and at the same time, to an entire history, 
to everything else except itself. hence, each testimony, each naming, is a fore-
grounding of itself as a catachrestic metaphor; where the testifier is faced with 
“the impossibility of deciding [the name], but the impossibility of remaining 




To compound matters, in eulogies, in testifying to the event of the 
passing, to the absence of the object of one’s witnessing, one has no choice 
but to use the person’s name. In naming the person, not only are questions of 
whether one is able to encompass the life of a person in a name, or whether it 
is adequate for a name to remember the person, opened—more pertinently, it 
is a also a name for a particular future. For, each time we call something, recall 
something, it has to be from a past; otherwise we can not do so: one cannot call 
to mind something that is absolutely unknown to one. however, each recollec-
tion is always already a reconstitution, a re-writing, a re-vision as well: hence, 
it is also an event that has not yet happened, it is also an event that is to come. 
In effect, each time an event is called to mind, each time the name of an event 
is uttered, it is the moment where all time comes together; the event is present 
but only insofar as the present is a future anterior moment.
 
This is no longer just a question of hermeneutics—the meaning(s) of 
both testimony, and the object of our testimony—but more pertinently a call-
ing into question of the relationality between the testifier, and her testimony. 
as one reads the text—attempts to read the life of the person—as one 
is writing a text in response to the text, is one always already framing it, not 
just in the sense of setting a boundary, limit, border, and giving it a particular 
shape, but more pertinently, accusing it of, setting it up for, something that 
(s)he might not even have done; framing her for a life that is not even hers to 
begin with? In writing of her, one is in the realm of biography, of inscribing 
the bios of the person—always keeping in mind that graphein is of the order of 
permanence, fixity; of death. and if we take into account that one’s bios is of 
the order of the social, the political (and not bare life, zoē), we must then take 
responsibility for the particular perception of her life that we are writing, that 
we are condemning to death, even as we are attempting to resurrect a certain 
memory of her. In resuscitating a certain memory, are we also framing her in 
that very way, condemning her to a particular frame: we should remember 
that a eulogy is often the last way in which people will hear of her, the last 
light in which she will be seen. and here, we have to reopen the register of 
the illegitimacy of authorship: in exerting the authority that every author, any 
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author, has to—one has no choice but to do so in order to write, speak—one 
is doing so without any validity whatsoever. In that manner, even if one is 
trying one’s utmost to respond to the life of the person, even if one is reading 
her as a response, trying to play detective with absolute rigour, care, respect, 
one can never be sure if one is discovering something about, or only unveiling 
the very clues that one has written, inseminated, as one is reading. [It is of no 
coincidence that in the classic hollywood thriller, the detective must throw 
in her badge—turn away from the law—in order to begin her true work, her 
actual finding. whilst this could suggest that being beyond the pale and justice 
might not always be antonymic, one cannot deny that a detective is always 
potentially in the realm of criminality: after all, most of the crimes are solved 
only when the detective resorts to breaking the law to obtain the crucial piece 
of evidence.] each reading, each writing, of the person, on her life, even if only 
temporal, provisional, is a momentary conviction—one that is made without 
any possible legitimacy; at best only beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
[each time you eulogise, its rules always already bind you. as you take 
the stand, you are taking a stance, mounting the final defense for, of, the per-
son, for her—you are her defense attorney and you are delivering a, her, dis-
course of praise. Those in front of you, potentially hearing, reading—perhaps 
even listening—to you, to your discourse, to the discourse of her through 
you, are making up their minds, a, their, final decision, passing a judgment 
on you, your discourse, and hence her—you are attempting to present the 
best side of her to them, to them as a judging panel, to a jury.11 This time, 
though, there is no prosecutor. But even as there may not be an overt attack 
on her, on the memory of her, every member of the jury is familiar with some 
aspect of her life that escapes the eulogy, that turns away from any possibil-
ity of eulogising; the discourse itself is haunted by its omissions, and these 
memories that have been marginalised are constantly prosecuting it. So, even 
as you attempt to quash them—as you play at defending her—you are always 
also her persecutor.]
11 The possibility of reading a eulogy as a defence in a court of law was opened to me through a conversa-
tion on September 7, 2010, with Philadel Yeo, in Singapore. 
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If we consider the notion that in the beginning was one’s name and that 
at the very end all that remains is the name, we then enter the realm where the 
name has two separate relationalities with time: on the one hand, the name 
shifts with time, is changed by time, is affected by time (this is the name that 
lives with the person); on the other hand, a name is always already outside 
time, at least the time of the person—a name is immortal. But even as one 
name is immortal, lives beyond the life of the person, this does not mean that 
it is free from the other changing, constantly shifting, name; the name that dies 
with the person remains to haunt the immortal name. Perhaps we might even 
posit that at any one time, everyone has two names—and that one’s spectral 
name is whispering to the other. The problem, the impossibility, lies in deter-
mining which one is speaking at any one time. 
In invoking the name of the other, we can also never tell which name 
we are uttering, speaking, speaking with, for, or to—and hence, we can also 
never quite tell which name we are responding to, with. 
But even as we foreground the illegitimacy of authority, of authorship, 
we should never forget that authority is granted by the other—for, if force, 
violence, has to be used, utilized, one no longer has authority. In other words, 
authority is given to us. In the realm of the eulogy, one is usually asked to 
write, speak, deliver, that particular requiem—this opens the register that one 
is responding to the name of the dead, even though the request for this re-
sponse comes from the living (either by way of the family, or when (s)he was 
alive). hence, there is a gap between the call for the response and the response 
itself. moreover, one cannot deny the fact that one is only an author—writing 
can only be known—at the moment that one is read: writing, authorship, only 
comes into being in the reading, through the reader, the other, even if the 
other is one’s self. Thus, not only is the response to the call made in blindness 
(to where it came from), the response itself is blind to itself until the moment 
it is called forth (through its reading). 
as we are attempting to write, all we can do is to write—after which, all 
we can do is take responsibility for the particular response by signing off on it. 
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here, perhaps we should pay attention to the “off ” that comes behind, 
after, with, each signing—for, the only time we actually need to leave our sig-
nature on something is if we are going to be away, absent, from it. otherwise, 
there would not be a need for us to verify our agreement—our presence—with 
the sign, a signage, our signing. and this opens the possibility that we have to 
sign off on our eulogy in case we are not there to read it, speak it—it is not all 
that uncommon to have someone else read it in our place. But perhaps more 
than that, each eulogy is in preparation for the eventuality of our own absence. 
each writing, each inscription, is in some way in preparation for our 
absence: in future-memory of the eulogy that will be written for us—a call for 
that eulogy that is always already to come. 
[This opens the register that every time we write, we are penning our 
own suicide note; as every writing is what will potentially remain of us when 
they find us dead. It is our trace—it is an echo of us—even if what is read, the 
sound that remains, has very little, nothing, to do with us. and it is this that 
Satoshi Kon captures beautifully in his farewell note to us: anything we write, 
everything we write, is haunted with Kon’s last line—“Now excuse me, I have 
to go.”]
In this manner, all writing is also a eulogy—except in this case a eulogy 
that doesn’t quite know what it is eulogising, or whether it is even eulogising. 
more than that, the very object of the eulogy remains unknown: for, even as 
you may be writing for yourself, this very self that you are attempting—per-
haps without even any intention—to eulogise continually evades, slips. here, 
we might even consider the notion of the eulogy as a call, keeping in mind 
that whenever you are making a call, you don’t quite know not only if it will be 
answered, nor who will answer it, you don’t actually know who you are calling, 
calling out to, making that call to, until it is answered. all you can do is dial, 
hold on—wait. and as vladimir and estragon have taught us, not only is there 
no time frame, nor telos, to waiting, there is also no object to waiting—even as 
they wait for Godot, there is no referentiality to the name. hence, they will not 
know even if he showed up (he might have always already been there); more 
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than that, even if someone turned up and proclaimed that he is Godot, they 
would have to take it on faith. Thus, even if Godot came, they might still be 
eternally waiting for Godot. all they can ever know, all we can ever know, is 
that they are waiting for Godot, and Godot is the name of waiting itself.
whenever you write, you sign off. what is left of you is your name. 
and the marking, your marking, your name, is the very name of your waiting. 
[here, we might momentarily divert and consider the case of anony-
mous notes, secret letters, and even secret names. whenever we are confront-
ed with one, there seems to almost always be the natural urge to discover who 
they came from, the source as it were of their authorship, even to the extent of 
random attribution (rather than leaving it unknown); as if the lack of a claim-
ant, a signature, opens up the uncomfortable notion that this is a eulogy that 
could be by anybody, everybody, including yourself—just that you didn’t even 
realise it. or even worse, that it could be written for you in your absence, in 
your own death that escaped you.]
In our inability to discern the call, nor the object, of the eulogy, all 
that we are left with are the tales that are spun—all that we know, insofar as 
knowing is an attempt to grasp, seize onto, are the effects that the tales have 
on us. In writing the eulogy, all that can be done is to spin these tales, keeping 
in mind that as we are weaving them, they are also weaving around, eluding, 
perhaps even avoiding us. and in the tales that we tell—since the eulogy is 
haunted by fictionality—all we can tell are stories. even if, particularly if, we 
foreground the notion that it is impossible to capture the life of the person. 
however, in the inability to see, we might be able to catch a glimpse—to echo 
michel deguy when he speaks of poetry—not of the very visible, nor of the 
invisible, but of the slightly visible.12
The name of the story. The story of a name.
12 when I asked deguy what he thought poetry was, his reply was: “Poetry does not unveil the very visible 
nor the invisible. Poetry instead unveils the slightly visible.” (Saas Fee, Switzerland, august 2004).
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where all we can do is tell the tale of a name, her name, spinning 
around with it, in it, spinning it into the stories that come with it, are built 
around it, within it; as though all we can do when attempting to eulogise a 
name is to develop a discourse around it—as if we are sitting for, speaking at, 
our agrégation, only in this case we are being watched, heard, judged by those 
who are present; even though la leçon (in a way we are delivering a lesson on 
the life of that particular name, even as we are being taught a lesson, being 
tested on that very lesson that we are giving) might not even be directed to-
wards, at, those very persons.13
13 The potential relation between la leçon and eulogies was opened to me in a conversation with chris 
Fynsk sometime in april 2010. In our particular conversation, Fynsk was recounting his experience of 
Jacques derrida delivering a speech—a lesson—on the pun. and this opened the register of the possibility 
that the name, a name, is the point—the hinge—around which every eulogy revolves, spins; yet at the same 
time, it is its exteriority, its puncture, as what is foregrounded is the very unknowability of the name, in 
particular what the name refers to. as we are attempting to pay homage to the name (giving an account of 
it, being accountable to it, recounting it), we are always also in an almost laughable state of being unable to 
do so—perhaps even to the extent of us punting on the name, where everyone is taking bets on whether we 
are ever able to do what we set out to do, as we are racing against time in our attempt to do so.

She tied you to a kitchen chair
She broke your throne 
and she cut your hair










Samson came to my bed
Told me that my hair was red
Told me I was beautiful and came into my bed
oh I cut his hair myself one night
a pair of dull scissors in the yellow light
and he told me that I’d done alright
and kissed me ‘til the mornin’ light, the mornin’ light
and he kissed me ‘til the mornin’ light
-reGINa SPeKTor, Samson
Judas … must you betray me with a kiss …
-aNdrew lloYd weBBer & TIm rIce, Gethsemane
Samson and delilah: a story of betrayal. 
“You are my sweetest downfall; I loved you first” (Spektor). hard to tell 
from whom these lines came—they could have been from either of them, from 
both of them. For, even as we are left with that report from Judges 13–16, we 
have to remember that it is a report. From whom, we have no real idea—why 
they had chosen to report it in that manner is yet another question; one that 
we might well choose to ignore as we will always remain blind to it. what we 
have to remember, though, is that we are reading a remainder—Samson is 
dead; delilah, we never hear from again.
delilah and Samson: a tale of forgotten love. 
But if it is a remainder that we are reading, are we also always attempt-
ing to read a particular forgetting—is it the forgetting itself that is allowing us 
to read? 
Perhaps, then: a eulogy to love. 
and if we are contemplating the possibility of a relationality between 
love and a eulogy, we must then open our receptors to the death(s) in there: 
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Samson suffers a real death—delilah’s fate is far worse; hers is a symbolic one, 
relegated to a mere tool of the Philistines, one who is erased the moment the 
deed is done. Perhaps what we must first pay attention to is the movement from 
love to death—and here, if we are attentive, we can often hear the cry of be-
trayal. For, one can only betray someone that one loves, or at the very least, has 
loved. and even when one is betraying that person, there is still a measure of 
love in it. when Judas betrays the Nazarene, he is both fulfilling scripture, and 
also preventing him from mattering “more than the words [he] say[s]” (web-
ber & rice: Heaven On Their Minds): even as he is giving up the Nazarene to 
the high priests, there is still an element of fidelity in his action. even if one 
were to contend that Judas’ intent remains veiled from us, the consequence of 
his betrayal continues to bear an echo of faithfulness to the fact that the Son of 
man had to die. If one were more generous and allowed the possibility of Judas’ 
betrayal being in fidelity to the teachings of the Nazarene, then it is a betrayal of 
the man in order to protect the ideals he was teaching and stood for, a betrayal 
of the person out of faithfulness to the idea. But no matter what, in choosing, in 
picking one over another, there is always already an act of betrayal. and what 
else is love but a certain selection, a choosing of one out of many others. This 
is not to say that love is necessarily possessive, claiming, but even if love is an 
openness to the possibility of another, this potentiality is only opened to some 
other(s), and not all others. “You are my sweetest downfall”—just you. 
To love, one must already betray—cut.
In order to love delilah, Samson has to first betray Yahweh: he was 
a Nazirite, and the breaking of this vow caused Yahweh to “turn away from 
him.”1 delilah, on the other hand, ostensibly betrays Samson for the love of 
money, for the “eleven hundred silver shekels” that she is promised in return 
for discovering “where his great strength comes from, and how we can mas-
ter him and bind him and reduce him to helplessness.”2 considering the fact 





strength, it is no stretch of the imagination to suggest that he had known that 
he was going to be betrayed—in other words, his love for delilah was there in 
spite of the impending, ongoing, betrayal. here, one could posit that his love 
for her was so strong as to blind him to her actions: but if we keep in mind the 
fact that he did thrice offer red herrings, then surely he was well aware of de-
lilah’s plans. In fact, she seems to have made no secret of what she was trying 
to achieve: each time he told her an alleged source of his strength, she would 
test it by going “the Philistines are upon you”;3 after which, she would proceed 
to accuse him of mocking her. more importantly, when he did finally offer 
her the secret to his strength, he was doing so in full knowledge of the con-
sequences: one could say that allowing her to betray him was his gift of love 
to her; almost as if he had cut his own hair—all she was doing was providing 
the shears. In fact, if love were an openness to the other, this would include—
cannot exclude—the possibility of being wounded by another; in love, one is 
always already open to potential betrayal. Perhaps even, one must betray to 
love, but in loving, one is also always haunted by betrayal.
In considering delilah’s role in their relationality, one is all too tempted 
to simply cast her as the seductress, a tool of the Philistines to lure Samson’s 
secret from him. whilst this might have been the overall strategy and result of 
her efforts, one must not forget that whilst Samson was in prison, “the hair that 
had been shorn off began to grow again.”4 So, even as “he has told his whole 
secret to me,”5 one does wonder if delilah had passed on all she had known 
to the Philistines—for, should they have known that “if my head were shorn, 
then my power would leave me and I should lose my strength and become 
like any other man”6 they would surely not have allowed his hair to re-grow; 
they would not have allowed him to begin to restore his vows, to re-boot his 
relationship with Yahweh. Perhaps her first betrayal was of Samson; the final 
betrayal though might have been of her people.






“But the bible didn’t even mention us, not even once …” (Spektor): at 
least not the tale of love that we are positing, that we are reading, that we are 
listening to, even as we may not be able to see it. But if we were listening, at-
tempting to respond to a particular call, we may never be able to know if that 
call was only meant for us, or if it was even meant for us—we may never even 
know if there was a call in the first place. They, it, may have always been voices 
in our—my—heads. Perhaps then, it is in reading, in attempting to respond, 
that we enact our acts of betrayal: in fidelity to one, we have no choice but to 
choose, to enact a certain death—cut—on the others. 
who ever said that love was two-way? even if it were mutual, it would 
consist of two singularities that were in love with one another; an other that 
remains fully singular, that remains fully other. The other person is an enigma, 
remains enigmatic. Thus, the reason for that love—why you love the other—is 
always already secret from the one who loves.  This is the only way in which 
the proclamation “I love you” remains singular, remains a love that is about the 
person as a singular person—and not merely about the qualities of the person, 
what the person is.  For, if the other person comes under your own schema, 
then the love for the other person is also completely transparent; one that you 
can know thoroughly, calculate; the other person becomes nothing more than 
a check-list.   and if it is the qualities that you love, once those qualities go 
away, so does the love.  only when the love for the other person is an enigmatic 
one—one that cannot be understood—is that love potentially an event. If so, 
it cannot be known before it happens; at best, it can be glimpsed as it is hap-
pening, or perhaps even only retrospectively.  hence, at the point in which it 
happens, it is a love that comes from elsewhere: this strange phenomenon is 
best captured in the colloquial phrase, I was struck by love or even more so by 
I was blinded by love.  This is a blinding in the very precise sense of, I have no 
idea why or when it happened; before I knew it, I was in love. cupid is blind for 
this reason: not just because love is random (and can happen to anyone, at any 
time), but more importantly because even after it happens, both the reason 




The unknowability in the relationship with the other person suggests 
that one can only begin to approach it through a ritual. This is the lesson that 
religions have taught us: since one is never able to phenomenally experience 
the god(s), one has no choice but to approach them through rites. Being sacra-
ments, they always bring with them an echo of secrets. For, even though one 
performs a particular ritual, there is no guarantee that one will receive what 
one is asking for, that the answer might not be something contrary, that there 
even is an answer. even as Samson cried out one last time to Yahweh, “lord 
Yahweh, I beg you, remember me: give me strength this once again…,”7 there 
was no way of knowing if he would be answered.8 all he knew at that point was 
that he was about to die—if Yahweh had answered his cry, the pillars would 
have crumbled and he would have died with the Philistines; if there was no an-
swer, the Philistines would have put him to death for attempting to kill them.
Perhaps that is the secret to love: an offering of death. Not just of all the 
potential others, but more pertinently of the self. 
an offering that knows nothing but the fact that it is offering. 
Samson went back to bed
Not much hair left on his head
Ate a slice of wonderbread and went right back to bed
Oh, we couldn’t bring the columns down
Yeah we couldn’t destroy a single one
And history books forgot about us
And the bible didn’t mention us, not even once
responding to the offering; reading—in that we find the eulogy.
7 Judges 16:28.
8 here, we might want to momentarily reopen the register of memory. Since Samson’s plea to Yahweh is 
one that invokes remembering, it opens the question of how he would be recalled by Yahweh. For, his 
strength would only be returned to him if the recollection was one that reinstated him as a Nazirite; if 
Yahweh remembered him as the betrayer, he would have continued to turn away from him. hence, in this 
plea, in the response to the plea if any, there is a measure of betrayal: Yahweh would have to choose one 




The silences we shared
were testaments of care.
The silence you now leave
a monument of grief.







Stop moping. cease mourning. and get on with it. which rather quickly warps 
into a jeering, a taunting, “go on … get over it.” But what are we attempting to 
cut ourselves off from? For, in order to “get over” a particular “it,” there needs 
to be an object that we can bypass, over-come, go over.
“Pick yourself up”—which usually comes in the form of encourage-
ment, from people that call themselves your friends. The question it brings 
with it though is—from what fall? and more importantly, why is mourning 
associated with a falling, a lowering, as if one is no longer fully human, an 
incomplete person, when one is mourning? what cannot be disputed though 
is that when we mourn, our lives are sometimes hijacked by that mourning; 
something does take a hold of you, and at those moments, our mastery of 
ourselves does go missing. Judith Butler reminds us that in Mourning and Mel-
ancholia, “Freud reminded us that when we lose someone, we do not always 
know what it is in that person that has been lost. So when one loses, one is also 
faced with something enigmatic: something is hiding in the loss, something 
is lost within the recesses of loss. If mourning involves knowing what one has 
lost (and melancholia originally meant, to a certain extent, not knowing), then 
mourning would be maintained by its enigmatic dimension, by the experi-
ence of not knowing incited by losing what we cannot fully fathom.”1 In other 
words, we might not ever know exactly what we are mourning for, let alone 
why—and in this way, how might then always be beyond our grasp. hence, we 
are grasped by something that we might never fully grasp, which drives us, 
compels us, quite often ceases us in its seizing—which suggests that in mourn-
ing, even though there might never be an understanding, we are always in a 
relationality with whomever, whatever, we are mourning. Butler continues: “it 
is not as if an “I” exists independently over here and then simply loses a “you” 
over there, especially if the attachment to “you” is part of what composes who 
“I” am. If I lose you, under those conditions then I not only mourn the loss, 
but I become inscrutable to myself.”2




In trying to “get over it,” are we trying to get over ourselves? or more 
than that: are we trying to get over the fact that we can never quite get over 
ourselves? 
amidst all of this, one can also hear the strains of Beckett’s “I can’t go 
on, I must go on.” Perhaps here, it is also a reminder that one “must go on,” 
when one “can’t go on.” In this way, the imperative of the “must” is not only an 
order, but also a plea to go on when one no longer can. 
In this all is perhaps a notion of time. as if mourning had a schedule, 
with an end-point (which can only be known if there is an expected end result, 
a telos, to it). and here, we can hear an echo of one Bush Jr. who announced 
on September 21, 2001, that the United States was done with—over—grieving, 
and that it was time for resolute action to take the place of grief.3 as if one 
could make a conscious decision to move on—even though one has no idea 
what exactly one is mourning. In this Bush Jr. is offering a solution, an answer, 
to a question that has yet to be determined, to a question that is attempting to 
form itself. and as avital ronell has taught us, “the dominant form of stupidity 
bucks the question entirely; it doesn’t allow for questions … ever resisting the 
question, dominant stupidity on the contrary, effaces it with the quickness of 
the answer.”4 For, in order to get over it, especially when one has no idea what 
it is, one has to refuse to think: whether that is actually possible is yet another 
question. one could posit that there is a denial at play, for there is a certain 
uncertainty, a certain plunge into the unknown, whenever one mourns. as 
Judith Butler shows us, “the disorientation of grief—“who have I become?” or, 
indeed “what is left of me?” “what is it in the other that I have lost?”—posits 
the “I” in the mode of unknowingness.”5 Perhaps then, what we fear most is 
not just the loss of the other, but ourselves, our own self. 
3 ‘a Nation challenged; President Bush’s address on Terrorism before a Joint meeting of congress,’ New 
York Times, September 21, 2001, p. B:4.
4 avital ronell, Stupidity. (chicago: University of Illinois Press), 2003: 43. 
5 Judith Butler. Precarious Life, 2006: 30.
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This is not to say that mourning can never end as well—even if there 
are traces, echoes, in you, which are left in you. however, this is an end that 
comes to you, perhaps behind your back, and which might not even be known 
to you, but one that you sense, though maybe only retrospectively. It is a time 
that comes to you, that calls out to you, and that you have to respond to, just 
as you had to respond to the call of mourning—where or who this second call 
comes from is perhaps even less knowable than the first.
But in order to even potentially catch a glimpse of sources, origins, we 
have to meditate on what it means to respond to a call in the first place. 
as one is attempting to respond to a call, one is always haunted by the 
question of whether one was responding to a call, or is the call always already 
a reading, an interpretation as it were, a version of the response: in attempting 
to respond to a call, is one also already writing that call into being. and since 
this call might have been meant solely for one—even if there are many mourn-
ing the same person, there is no way of knowing if it is the same mourning 
that is taking place—one is in the situation where all one can say is that one is 
mourning. In other words, one is left with the situation where one can only at-
tempt to respond to the call; whilst never quite being sure if that very call were 
merely voices in one’s head.
It might be helpful to momentarily tune-in to another response, an-
other answer to a call, and consider werner hamacher’s response to Peter 
o’connor and his call, a call for a response. hamacher asks: “why is the call 
thought of as something which, rather than taken, taken down, or taken in—
be it from a specific agent, subject, principle, preferably a moral one—will be 
given? and if each call which issues is destined to make demands on the one 
who is called (but this is also questionable), is it already settled that I will hear, 
that I will hear this call and hear it as one destined for me? Is it not rather the 
case that the minimal condition to be able to hear something as something lies 
in my comprehending it neither as destined for me nor as somehow oriented 
toward someone else? Because I would not need to hear it in the first place if 
the source and destination of the call, of the call as call, were already certain 
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and determined. Following the logic of calling up, of the call … and along with 
that the logic of demand, of obligation, of law, no call can reach its addressee 
simply as itself, and each hearing is consummated in the realm of the possibil-
ity not so much of hearing as being able to listen up by ceasing to hear. hear-
ing ceases. It listens to a noise, a sound, a call; and so hearing always ceases 
hearing, because it could not let itself be determined other than as hearing, to 
hearing any further. hearing ceases. always. listen …”6 as hamacher teaches 
us, listening is the openness to the possibility of the other, of the potentiality of 
being in communication—in communion even—with the other; an objectless 
other, an other that might be completely other to itself. It is this objectless-
ness of the other that ensures this communion is one without consumption, 
without subsumption; the other remains wholly other to ourselves even as we 
attempt to fleetingly get in touch. Thus, in order to attempt to respond, to be 
in touch, one has no choice but to momentarily cease hearing, to cut off from 
hearing the call, whilst at the same time listening, opening one’s receptors to 
everything other than the call. In this way the call remains for one a call, one 
that might never have been made for one, but a call that one has picked up, 
and in that manner made one’s, even as it is never quite one’s; perhaps in at-
tempting to listen—a listening that doesn’t purport, pretend, to have an object, 
objective, aim—all that can be attended to, all that remains, is the very fact that 
there has been, might have been, a call. 
and here, if we listen carefully, we can hear the echo of the telephone. 
and in particular the call of the phone, ringing; not necessarily for us, but just 
calling out for a response—as long as we are within earshot of it. even in this 
day of caller-identification technology, there is no guarantee that the name 
flashing on your screen has any correspondence to the person(s) on the other 
end. The only way in which one can find out who—if anyone—is there, is to 
pick up. and in doing so, one always already opens oneself to the effects of, to 
being affected by, another: who hasn’t had their day ruined by a bad phone call. 
This might be true even if there were no known other on the end of the line: 
for, a prank call often ends up affecting us the most.
6 werner hamacher. ‘Interventions’. in Qui Parle: Journal of Literary Studies 1, no. 2, Spring 1987: 37–42. 
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In fact, one can posit that one is opening oneself most to the other—al-
most to the extent of privileging the other—when it comes to calls. as one can 
never know who is on the other line, each time one picks up the phone, one is 
opening oneself to the possibility of being pranked, to being made fun of, of 
facing, coming face to face with, an other that is out to humiliate. moreover, 
to even know that it is a joke, a prank call, one has to pick up. and even if one 
does not speak to the person at the other end, one might already have been af-
fected by the call: no one ever said that we will always like the calls we receive. 
By picking up one has already paid the price.
and since picking up already entails a response, this means that one 
will never be able to calculate, verify, know, if one’s response to the call is a 
good one, or not, until after one responds; and even then it is only someone 
else, another, some other who will decide its status. But regardless of the ver-
dict, the sentence, the judgment of one’s sentences, one will always already pay 
the price for attempting to respond. 
here again, we can hear another crossed line, and pick up on lucretius’ 
intervention; and in particular, his conception of communication which is a 
movement away from a transmission, a one-way movement, of information. 
In The Nature of Things, he develops a notion of the movement of atoms, and 
communication involves the touching, collision, interaction, of atoms from 
two persons: the negotiations between the atoms take place in a space in-be-
tween, film, skin, simulacra, and communication is the outcome of the rela-
tionality between the atoms. after which, both persons are affected, potential-
ly altered, by this communication, whilst maintaining their singularity. hence, 
it would be impossible to claim that there was miscommunication; for, that 
would have to assume an a priori knowledge of what was going to be commu-
nicated. If communication happens in the skin, and its effects are only known 
after the fact, this suggests that all one can say about communication is that it 
is an attempt to touch the other. and more than that, it is also the opening of 
the self, an openness, to being affected by another—in ways that one cannot 
know until it is perhaps too late—to potentially being wounded by the other.
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and if we once again pick up another line, open another register of the 
telephone, we might want to eavesdrop on the pact between alexander Gra-
ham Bell and his brother melville. In robert v. Bruce’s biography, Alexander 
Graham Bell and the Conquest of Solitude, he notes that both of them made a 
“solemn compact that whichever of us should die first would endeavor to com-
munication with the other if it were possible to do so.”7 Since melville was the 
one who passed on first, this contract put alexander on the receiving end; in 
other words, he had to be constantly prepared to receive this call from beyond. 
In this sense—especially if you were to take into consideration the fact that 
until melville’s death both brothers had been working on early prototypes of 
the telephone—the telephone can be read as an attempt for aleck to maintain 
the possibility of keeping in touch with melly. It is this trope, both of hope and 
of the openness to potentiality, that echoes in the telephone; after all, the in-
strument of distant sound allows us the possibility of touching the other, even 
and especially in the absence of that same other. however, this is a connection 
that is not premised on knowing, but on an openness. and here, we might tap 
into yet another crossed-line, into The Telephone Book, and replay the voice of 
avital ronell that is sitting, housed, in the inbox of our answering machine: 
“the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, 
or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading.”8 This suggests that the 
very connection between the receiver and the other is the point of connectivity 
itself; the point of communication is the possibility of this communion.
when one speaks of communion, we can always already hear the echo 
of “do this in memory of me,” an echo that has come to us before, and is per-
haps making its second calling. Thus, we might even posit that in communica-
tion there is a trans-substantiation that takes place—all persons involved are 
changed, affected, altered even, but in a manner that might never be perceiv-
able, knowable, known. So, even as one has to cease hearing, even as one has 
7 robert v. Bruce. Alexander Graham Bell and the Conquest of Solitude. (New York: cornell University 
Press), 1990: 63.
8 avital ronell. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech. (lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press), 1989: 380.
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to stop hearing the call, one is attempting to do so in fidelity to the call—in 
order to listen without hearing, to respond without assuming knowledge of 
the call, to respond without effacing, one has to stop, cut, perform a caesarean, 
but with love.
This then leads us to the question: if we cease to hear, how can we even 
begin to respond to a call? For, in order to begin to respond, we must have a 
notion of who, or what, we are responding to. however, if we already claim to 
know what, or whom, we are responding to, it is no longer a response in its 
fullest sense. So clearly, even as we cease to hear, it is not as if we are completely 
effacing the call; what we are in effect attempting to respond to is a memory—
by attempting to listen, we are attending, doing so in memory of the call. all 
whilst trying not to forget that the memory of the call itself is haunted by the 
possibility of forgetting. 
But perhaps, it is precisely the spectre of forgetting that allows us to 
even begin to respond in the first place. For, it is our inability to know if we 
ever know, that leaves a gap in knowing, that maintains the very notion of 
unknowability in knowing itself, that allows the question to remain in every 
statement—and what else is this gap but the skin in-between, the simulacra 
in which, with which, we negotiate with the other; all whilst maintaining the 
otherness of the other. 
after all, one must try not to forget that one cannot be too close—
space is needed—to touch. 
The inability to know what we are responding to whilst attempting 
to do so suggests that each response is singular: it happens in a particular 
time, space, situation, and no matter what the response, what the attempted 
response is, one can never have the metaphysical comfort, certainty, that the 
response is correct, or wrong. But just because it is in the realm of opinion 
does not alleviate our responsibility. If anything, it might actually increase it: 
after all, if there is no Grund, one is choosing a particular path, making a cer-
tain decision, based on nothing but the fact that one is. For, each decision 
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always already brings with it a certain measure of violence: in picking, one 
has no choice but to seize, to separate, to exclude all the other possibilities, all 
possible others. however, this is an exclusion that is a result of the choosing, 
a particular decision made in a singular time and space: this is not an a priori 
effacement. 
and here, it might be helpful to turn to Jean-François lyotard and 
Jean-loup Thébaud and their conversation in Just Gaming when they posit 
the difference between terror and violence. Terror is a “blow that is not struck 
on the adversary but it is hoped that the blow will be borne by the third party, 
the witness, public opinion. In such a case, everyone is caught ‘without free-
dom.’”9 violence, on the other hand, is a “two sided battle, [where] my oppo-
nent thinks that what I think and do is unjust, and I think that what he does 
and thinks is unjust. well his freedom is complete and so is mine.”10 when it 
comes to terror, one is no longer free to think, one is no longer free to negoti-
ate; one is closed to potentialities. In violence, one maintains an openness to 
other possibilities, to the possibility of another. In other words, terror is the 
state where there is no longer any space, where there is no longer any possibil-
ity of touching, where there is no longer any other—where there is no longer 
any communion, only consumption. hence, terror is the situation where eve-
rything is known, everything is clear, calculable. 
and it is not as if doing so comes without a price: once something is 
completely calculable, it is also completely exchangeable, completely transpar-
ent. here, we might momentarily tune in to Jean Baudrillard and attend to his 
warning that total transparency is the point where “every individual category 
is subject to contamination, substitution is possible between any sphere and 
any other: there is total confusion of types.”11 Thus, “each category is general-
9 Jean-François lyotard and Jean-loup Thébaud. Just Gaming. trans. wlad Godzich. (minnesota: Univer-
sity of minnesota Press), 1985: 70.
10 Ibid.




ised to the greatest possible extent, so that it eventually loses all specificity and 
is reabsorbed by all the other categories. when everything is political, nothing 
is political anymore, the word itself is meaningless. when everything is sexual, 
nothing is sexual anymore, and sex loses its determinants. when everything is 
aesthetic, nothing is beautiful or ugly anymore, and art itself disappears. This 
paradoxical state of affairs … is simultaneously the complete actualisation of 
an idea, the perfect realisation of the whole tendency of modernity, and the 
negation of the idea and that tendency, their annihilation by virtue of their 
very success, by virtue of their extension beyond their own bounds ….”12 In 
order for any response to be possible, there have to be boundaries, borders, 
limits. For, without the separation, the space, one would not be able to even 
begin communicating with another; everything would just be the same. In 
other words, what has to be maintained is an exteriority, a finitude to all ges-
tures of knowing. This also means that all responding, all response, is always 
already finite. 
If this were so, a question remains with us: what of the situation in 
which the call was made? The trouble is: if one can never be sure what the 
call even is, when, or even where, it came from—if one is blind to both the 
source and the object of the call—one is attempting to respond to a complete 
unknown, an absolute unknowability. however, even though there is no pos-
sibility of verification, one is still responding—this suggests that there is still a 
measure of exchange that is taking place. whether this exchange can be meas-
ured is yet another question; one that perhaps can never be addressed. and 
since there is an exchange that takes place in spite of the fact that the exchange 
may be impossible, this suggests that the exchange is a symbolic exchange—
ritualistic, formal, nothing more—and nothing less—than a form; where the 
form of the exchange is everything—and in which each individual component 
is meaningless except for its role within the ritual itself. 
and it is this that Georges Bataille speaks of when he describes a gen-




it has no inherent meaning. Thus, it is the significance of the object and not 
its signification that is of interest. This is why in Bataille’s conception, sacri-
fice plays such a crucial role, where the “essence is to consume profitlessly”:13 
this is where each exchange is beyond rationality, beyond calculability, beyond 
reason itself; “unsubordinated to the ‘real’ order and occupied only with the 
present.”14 Bataille continues: “sacrifice destroys that which it consecrates. It 
does not have to destroy as fire does; only the tie that connected the offering 
to the world of profitable activity is severed, but this separation has the sense 
of a definitive consumption; the consecrated offering cannot be restored to 
the real order.”15 Since there is no need for a physical change in the object of 
sacrifice—“it does not have to destroy as fire does”—this suggests that the tie 
that is severed is ruptured symbolically. and here, we can re-open the earlier 
register of trans-substantiation when we consider sacrifice: the form remains 
the same; in fact there is no perceivable change—this is the point at which 
all phenomenology fails—but there is always already a difference, an absolute 
separation from the “real order,” from logic, calculability, reason. The object 
of sacrifice, “the victim[,] is a surplus taken from the mass of useful wealth … 
once chosen, he is the accursed share, destined for violent consumption. But 
the curse tears him away from the order of things …”16
and it is this tearing away from the order of things—the order of ra-
tionality—that “restores to the sacred world that which servile use has degrad-
ed, rendered profane.”17 For, only when it is no longer useful, when it is no 
longer abstracted—subjected, subsumed under—merely a use-value, can the 
object be an object as such, can a subject be a subject as such; a singularity. It 
is perhaps ironic that only within a general economy is singularity preserved. 
however, one must remember that the object—or subject—of the sacrifice is 
never calculated; its worth is never in question, nor even taken into account. 
In fact, it is never so much who or what is sacrificed, but the fact that there is 







a sacrifice. we find in The Accursed Share many tales of sacrifice and in each 
of them there is a sense of reversibility. For instance, in aztec wars, all deaths 
were seen as a sacrifice to the gods: if victorious, the aztecs would sacrifice 
the prisoners; however, “if the warrior had himself been overcome instead of 
returning a victor, his death on the field of battle would have had the same 
meaning as the ritual sacrifice of his prisoner: it would have satisfied the hun-
gry gods.”18 It is this reversibility that can also be found in the tale of abraham 
and Isaac.19 when abraham brings Isaac up to mount moriah as a sacrifice 
to the lord, he is asked by Isaac, “… where is the lamb for the sacrifice?” his 
answer is, “God himself will provide one.” Unknown to abraham at the time, 
his response (if one can call it a response at all for it was an empty statement; it 
was neither a truth nor a lie to Isaac),20 is precisely what occurs: it is God who 
provides the object for the holocaust—the ram that is burnt in Isaac’s place. at 
the point, in the moment, he raises his knife to sacrifice Isaac, abraham has 
already killed him—this is the sacrifice that God required: it is an objectless 
sacrifice; the act of killing Isaac is the sacrifice; this is the kind of sacrifice that 
“does not have to destroy as fire does.” It does not matter whether Isaac, or the 
ram, dies: in either case it “would have satisfied the hungry gods.” The sacrifice 
itself is a ritual, is purely formal; the exact object—whether it is a warrior or 
the prisoner—is irrelevant. 
even though there is no necessary object in the sacrifice, we must never 
18 Ibid.: 54.
19 Genesis 22:1–19.
20 one can posit that at this point, abraham demonstrates a true understanding of communication: it is 
not so much what is said—in fact the signification of what is said is sometimes completely irrelevant—but 
that it is said. For, it would have been completely cruel of him to have told Isaac the truth (“you are the 
ram”). Nor would it have sufficed for him to have remained silent. By answering Isaac with a performative 
statement, by performing a response to his son’s question, abraham told neither the truth nor lied: all he 
did was utter a response.
one could constitute abraham’s response as one that resonates with an ironic distance: a response in 
sound, in form; a response that is responding to the Isaac precisely by not responding. This may well be 
abraham being attentive to the very sound of Isaac himself, to the laughter echoing within the one who 
laughs (yishhak: he who laughs)—a moment when the response differentiated the essence from the essen-
tial. and what else is laughter but the very rupture of all things, the short-circuiting of everything: where 
all is heard is a sound; meaningless, but overflowing at the same time.
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forget that reciprocity is an obligation. For, even beyond the notions of mores 
and social obligation, one is always already responding to a call—even the act 
of ignoring, of not picking up, of making the other redial, call out again, is a 
response in itself. The only choice one has—the choice that one is obliged to 
make—is the manner in which one responds. hence, the difference between ter-
ror and violence is that of responses, ways of attending to calls. But just because 
one has to respond does not mean that there is any knowledge of the response 
before responding: since it is singular, all that can be known is that one is at-
tempting to respond, and the response is an openness to responding to the call. 
and what else is the sacrifice but that of time itself. Time that is sacrificed 
in responding, to respond, and in response—without which one cannot even be-
gin to attend to any possibility of response. But it is not as if time can be known, 
or measured; at best, it can be taken into account, accounted for, calculated, after 
the event, after the response has been made. and even after the sacrifice of time, 
there is still no guarantee that there is any necessary outcome to the response—in 
fact, one can never even verify if there was any response to begin with. 
listen. For, that is all we can do. Not because we listen for—there is no 
necessary object to the call, to a calling. But because there is no call unless we 
listen; and call the name of the other as we listen. 
and even as we utter the name of the other in our attempt to respond 
to another, to mourn the other, we might want to keep in mind Judith Butler’s 
forewarning that in responding, “I might try to tell a story here about what I 
am feeling, but it would have to be a story in which the very “I” who seeks to 
tell the story is stopped in the midst of the telling; the very “I” is called into 
question by its relation to the other, a relation that does not precisely reduce 
me to speechlessness, but does nevertheless clutter my speech with signs of its 
undoing. I tell a story about the relations I choose, only to expose, somewhere 
along the way, the way I am gripped and undone by these very relations. my 
narrative falters, as it must.”21 In attempting to respond, we always run the 
21 Judith Butler. Precarious Life, 2006: 23.
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risk that the very response itself might never get off the runway, might remain 
firmly stuck to the tarmac, even as we are racing along trying to reach another 
at the other end of the line. [and in this particular response, in echoing no-
tions of the ground, there is already a response, an “undoing” of the “I” as it is 
“called into question by its relation to the other,” to another. For, the term “tar-
mac” came to me through a call, through another, from a distant sound—her, 
me-k’s, voice—and in resounding it, and fore-grounding its resounding in this 
retelling, the “narrative falters, as it must.” and in that stumbling, we might 
perhaps catch a glimpse, hear an echo, of that call—in tripping up, perhaps we 
might actually listen as we momentarily cease to hear.








we must, but we must not like it—mourning, that is, mourning 
itself if such a thing exists: not to like it or love through one’s 
own tear but only through the other, and every tear is from the 
other, the friend, the living, as long as we ourselves are living, 
reminding us, in holding life, to hold on to it. 
-JacQUeS derrIda, The Work of Mourning
what does it mean to cry for another, to tear for them? Barring a performa-
tive moment,1 it is not as if one could will oneself to tear(s)—one is moved to 
tears, one is taken over, seized, in that moment. often, one is also ground to a 
halt, ceased in that moment—and one is nothing other than the very tears that 
are pouring out of one self. Perhaps it is in that dual movement, the stasis of 
being grounded, and the frenzy of the outpouring, that we can catch a glimpse 
of the constant duel that is in tearing itself: as we are crying, there is always 
already a tearing apart that is going on; a ripping that is not external, nor from 
a source other to ourselves, but one that is occurring within. For, in some 
way, we have always known that this moment of tearing happens to us in us, 
is brought upon ourselves by no one but our self. after all, we can only truly 
tear for someone that we care for, that we have opened ourselves to, that we 
have responded to, and called our friend. as Jacques derrida has taught us, “to 
have a friend, to look at him, to follow him with your eyes, to admire him in 
friendship, is to know in a more intense way, already injured, always insistent, 
and more and more unforgettable, that one of the two of you will inevitably 
see the other die.”2 To respond to the call of friendship, to respond to the other 
by calling her your friend, is to already open yourself to the possibility of her 
death, to the call of death herself.
as we mourn for her, are we also tearing ourselves from ourselves; 
1 even if it is a performance, when one is shedding tears in order to elicit an effect, one is often—especially 
if the performance is a worthy one—caught in the moment. we see this most clearly in the work of actors, 
and professional mourners. at the point in which they are crying, they are also seized by those tears, which 
ends up taking over the performance, and quite often themselves—in that moment, it is often impossible 
to distinguish the dancer from the dance, the tears from the one who is crying. 
2 Jacques derrida. The Work of Mourning. edited by Pascale-anne Brault & michael Naas, (chicago: University 
of chicago Press), 2001: 107.
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foregrounding the separation of our self? Is the mourning of a physical death, 
her death, the closest we can ever come to knowing our own death? For, when 
our own death comes to us, tears us from our self, it will be a moment that is 
beyond knowledge, on the outside of knowing—at least any cognitive knowl-
edge that we can speak of now. at best, we can address, think of, death through 
an imaginative gesture, moment. To even contemplate our own deaths, we 
need to tear ourselves from our self; we need to imagine ourselves as other to 
our self. and since there is a gap between the imagined other and our self—
otherwise the two would merely be the same thing—even though this space 
can never be verified—it has to be taken on faith—this suggests that this other 
within the self is one that is, and remains, wholly other. and if the other re-
mains wholly alterior, mourning is then always already haunted by fiction, and 
only possible due to fiction itself. In attempting to mourn, we have to read; 
whilst mourning we have no choice but to write. 
here, we might hear an echo of Thoth, the scribe, the egyptian god of 
writing; and in particular Plato’s warning from Phaedrus: instead of writing 
being a “potion for memory and wisdom,” it would “introduce forgetfulness 
into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using their memory 
because they will put their trust in writing, which is external and depends on 
signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember from the inside, com-
pletely on their own.”3 Plato’s warning, though, might hint at a form of hope for 
mourning itself. For, one can never remember an other that is wholly other as 
such: all one can hope for is to catch a glimpse of that other, an image of that 
other, and have that other brought to mind. In other words—and here we again 
have no choice but to speak in the words of the other—this is a figurative re-
membering, a reminder, remainder even, of the name of the other; and perhaps 
by naming the other, even if it is the other within, by using something “which is 
external and depends on signs that belong to others,” we might catch a momen-
tary sight of something. [and this is a something that cannot be named, until 
perhaps after, but even then it might always remain only a possibility.]




Perhaps it is this inherent frustration—of naming yet being unable to 
know what it is one is naming—that can be heard in writing. and here, we 
turn, tune in, to hear another teaching, that of avital ronell, who brings to 
our attention martin heidegger’s teaching: “sometimes you have to scream to 
be heard. This is what heidegger says regarding Nietzsche in What is Called 
Thinking? Nietzsche, the shiest and most quiet of men had to scream, institut-
ing the most famous inscribing/cry—the schreiben/schrei, crit/écrit, or grito/
escrito—with which philosophy must evermore contend.”4 The fact that we are 
hearing ronell echoing heidegger echoing Nietzsche should not be lost on us 
here; and this is especially significant if we tune in again to martin heidegger 
when he teaches us that “teaching is even more difficult than learning … be-
cause what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, lets 
nothing else be learned than—learning. The teacher is far ahead of his appren-
tices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they—he has to learn 
to let them learn … The teacher is far less assured of his ground than those 
who learn are of theirs.”5 The question that is opened, then, is one that we hear 
rather often, almost too often such that it loses some of its significance, that of 
so what is all this yelling about? If there is a certain measure of screaming, cry-
ing out, in writing, there is presumably something that is being projected out 
to, into, the world; something that is being wrenched out of one forcefully, and 
perhaps even is being thrust onto some other, someone else, who never quite 
intended to hear it in the first place. Quite often we hear a scream without even 
knowing where, or whom, it comes from—it can be a noise from afar; which 
reopens for us the notion of distant sounds, disembodied voices, tele-phones. 
and in a way the echoing of teachings is a movement of thought, of voice—
whether the thoughts are echoed the same way or not is an entirely different 
question. This is the lesson of the childhood game Chinese Whispers: the echo 
never quite echoes in the same way. otherwise, there would have been no 
way for echo to convey her own echo to Narcissus. In this sense, whenever 
we are writing, inscribing, a eulogy, even though—and perhaps precisely due 
4 avital ronell. ‘deviant Payback: The aims of valerie Solanas’. in valerie Solanas. SCUM Manifesto. (london: 
verso), 2004: 3.
5 martin heidegger. What is Called Thinking? trans. J. Glenn Gray. (New York: Perennial), 2004: 15.
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to the fact that—we cannot truly know what, or whom, we are eulogising, we 
are screaming out; and what we are yelling, throwing out, wrenching out of 
ourselves, is the fact that we are attempting to eulogise whilst being unable 
to do so. what we are doing is tearing ourselves through our tears, through 
tearing for. 
however, as heidegger points out, re-echoing Nietzsche once again, 
“on the one hand, the common idea and views must be shouted at when they 
want to set themselves up as the judges of thought, so that men will wake up. 
on the other hand, thinking can never tell its thoughts by shouting.”6 For, “‘it 
is the stillest words that bring on the storm. Thoughts that come on doves’ 
feet guide the world.’ (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part II, ‘The Stillest hour’).”7 
Perhaps then, what is most pertinent about writing, the imaginative gesture, 
the eulogy, is what remains silent—what remains unheard, unhearable even, 
in, within, all the sound.
In tearing, one always runs the risk of a complete ripping, wounding, 
where the opening completely ruptures. But each time there is an opening, 
it is always also a particular closing, a stopping, a cut—caesurae. as it cuts, 
splits, what remains is the fact that it is splitting from something: the caesurae 
is never quite complete; a relationality remains. whether we can know what is 
held together in that relationality, or how it is joined, or even what this joining 
is, might always remain veiled from us: however, the fact that in the cutting 
remains a trace, an echo, of this relationality should not be dismissed. here, 
one should try not to forget that a dash separates, but at the same time keeps 
the separated joined. Perhaps in any separation and joining, in any joining 
with separation, there is a dashing that occurs, as both bodies propel towards 
each other, from a distance, no matter how infinitesimal. For, we might also 
remember that it is a separation—space—that is required for any touching to 
occur. In this sense, it is the opening, potential wounding, which is necessary 





ping, tearing, through writing that is needed for any possibility of mourning, 
crying, tears. 
which leaves us with the question: if what we are writing, saying, re-
mains unwriteable, unsayable, then what is it that we are saying, writing, as we 
are not-saying, not-writing? In eulogising, in writing about her, in speaking 
for the memory of her, what we do—all we can do—is name her. and here, 
we call upon martin heidegger’s echo one more time (naming him as we do 
so): “naming is a kind of calling, in the original sense of demanding and com-
mending. It is not that the call has its being in the name; rather every name 
is a kind of call.”8 For, as we name him, we have called him to our presence, 
a summoning that disregards his will—whether he wants to be called or not 
is irrelevant—we have issued a directive for him to appear before us, not nec-
essarily in person but in thought. Now whether it is his thought or not that 
appears before us is yet another question—we have dragged this particular 
notion, line, sentence, statement, from its context; hence, it is a certain reading 
of heidegger, with its accompanying violence on him, his work, his corpus, 
we call forth, as we write about it. In other words, the only thing that we truly 
summon, which is completely separate from us, independent of our thought, 
wholly other from us, is his name itself. Not just “every name is a kind of call,” 
but more so, every name is a call, as all we can call is a name.
So, as we write-speak of her, as we attempt to eulogise in order to 
mourn, all we are doing is naming her, over and over again, throughout the 
course of writing-speaking. as we are speaking of her, we are calling her, call-
ing her name to us, to mind; doing this in memory of her.
her name: naming her, and all others that have her name, at the same 
time. her name: offered to her memory—whilst never sure what memory we 
are offering, or even if the name that we are uttering is her name any longer, 
was ever even her name. For, (s)he did not give that name to herself: it was 




secret, only known to herself. all we can say, all we can utter, is the name that 
is known to us; and hopefully in that naming, uttering, repetition of her name, 
we might hear an echo of her name.
all we can do is echo her name, over and over again—in an offering 
to time.




a book is finished only 
when its object has vanished





The beauty of writing lies—perhaps writing only lies—in the always un-
written, the un-writeable; the always imagined, yet outside the realm of the 
imaginable. This is both the strength of writing and forever its weakness—
trying to capture but always failing in representation. The scribbles on a 
page, the blobs of ink that appear, speak—the phantom of the voice seems to 
constantly resurrect—of something; an event, an occurrence. But the event 
it speaks of is always already dead; the word speaks not of it, but of a trans-
substantiated event, the ghost of the event—there is necromancy at play. 
-
Not that it matters. For the risen event, perhaps akin to a phoenix—
a re-generation, a re-incarnation—then takes flight. and develops a life of 
its own; it is now its own pure image: without reflexivity, without referent, 
sans papiers. and ultimately sans sens; for meaning requires an external 
correspondence. a simulated event is purely internal—it refers to nothing 
but itself; it speaks of nothing but itself. In this sense, every sign is a mean-
ingless gesture: the meaning that is derived is precisely because it is imbued 
with meaning by its receiver; impregnated by its emptiness. The sign is a 
vacuum; that is, by its very existence, full. orphaned at the moment of its 
birth, it is then embodied by the receiver and already re-born complete 
with plastic surgery. and it is precisely this sign—which has nothing to do 
with the event—that draws us into action, an almost arbitrary action: in 
fact, whenever we act, we are acting on absolutely nothing.
-
In other words, we are always already acting as if we can. 
The problem is when we forget this as if, and act as though we 
know what we are doing, as though our actions are based on knowledge, 




For, as we were warned, there are consequences to this simulated 
clarity. This is the point where everything is like everything else, without 
the ironic distance that like and as if do not translate to equivalences; simi-
lar is not the same—but since everything is taken to be everything else, 
this is when we move into the point of absolute transparency, and utter 
meaninglessness. 
and not only is meaninglessness the problem. If everything can be 
flattened, nothing is singular; there is no longer an irreducible difference 
in humans, in us: we are all completely and utterly exchangeable. 
-
what has to be fore-grounded in each act, what we need to remind 
ourselves to try not to forget, is the potentiality of forgetting. 
 
-
But instead of nihilism, the apex of pure beauty is precisely in this 
absence. This is where the un-speakable is spoken; through the complete 
absence of speech. and just like the void that we are inexplicably drawn 
to—the door that is marked there is nothing behind here always already has 
to be opened—the moment we see it, consideration has already left us. For, 
it is not as if we can escape signification: we are all born into, thrown into, 
language. But it is the recognition that all sign systems refer to nothing but 
themselves that gives us the freedom to play, to imagine, to hope. For, if 
there is no absolute truth—and perhaps he would even turn that statement 
on itself—all we are left with is an undecideable, even undecipherable, 
world. whilst this may be daunting—there is no longer certainty—this is 
also liberating; no one can tell you how you should think, or live. 




what is at stake is the very possibility of an event.
and it is precisely the singularity of events—an event—that haunts 
us, that continues to escape all knowing, all attempts to know. 
an event, “characterized entirely, in a paradoxical way, by its un-
canniness, its troubling strangeness—it is the irruption of something im-
probable and impossible—and its troubling familiarity: from the outset it 
seems totally self-explanatory, as though predestined, as though it could 
not but take place.”1
Just like death. 
one can only utter death metaphorically, naming something that 
one cannot have a prior experience of; without any possibility of a referent. 
death … a catachrestic metaphor … a pure name. 
-
and death is precisely what haunts each name, each act of naming. 
each naming is always already a naming in anticipation of the pos-
sibility of death. 
 
-
Perhaps this is why I am refusing to mention his name even as I am 
speaking about him. 
But is it possible to mourn, to say adieu without a name: can we 
ever mourn anything but the passing of a name? For, it is the paradoxical 
1 The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact. trans. chris Turner. (oxford: Berg), 2005: 130.
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nature of names that allows us to, at least momentarily, approach death. It 
is only in the foregrounding of the singular-plurality of the name that we 
escape the banality of clarity, of transparency, of the claim to knowing the 
person that we are mourning. and which allows us to mourn the passing 
that was always already in the name, whilst maintaining the absolute alter-
ity of the person; her absolute singularity. 
-
and even as we are attempting to bear witness to this passing—for 
what else are we doing by attempting to speak of something we cannot know 
about, attempting to speak the impossible—we are faced with the problem 
of either letting him speak for himself, or attempting to speak for him. 
If we are content to speak for him, we risk effacing him, speaking 
over him, as if he never spoke; silencing him. 
If we only allow him to speak for himself, citing him, quoting him, 
placing those vampire marks around his words (even in full fidelity to 
him), we are still enacting a violence onto him. This might even be a worse 
violence to his voice: appropriating it as if it were his words, whilst divorc-
ing ourselves from the responsibility that I am the one that is giving voice 
to his already silent voice. 
Perhaps when faced with this Beckettian paradox, I have no choice 
but to speak as if I can; I have no choice but to allow him to speak as if he 
can—I have to vampiricise him, and let him speak through me, as if that 
were even legitimate to begin with. 
and take full responsibility that it is I who am calling forth this 
voice; as if in a séance, where I am the shaman. or a telephone. 
here, we must redial on the promise between aleck and melly, and 




and pick up the phone. 
-
For this moment, though, even as I answer the call, and take full 
responsibility for answering this particular call over all other calls—just 
as important, just as relevant—taking into account the fact that this call 
might never have be meant for me, I shall let the call speak through me, 
and at most, lend my voice to the call. 
But doing so whilst always keeping in mind the static that is in all 
calls, the silent voices, the ghosts, spectres, hauntings, interjections, inter-
ventions; allowing all the different registers to speak, remaining open to 
the possibilities, forgettings, memories of the to-come, the yet-to-come, 
the always-already-come. Keeping in mind that all response is elliptical; 
that when we attempt to respond, we do not hear, but in fact cease hear-
ing, puncture knowing—that all we can do is attend to the possibility of 
attending;
By listening …
The absolute rule, that of symbolic exchange,
is to return what you received.
Never less, but always more.
The absolute rule of thought is to return
the world as we received it: unintelligible.
And if it is possible, to return it a little bit more
unintelligible.
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